

# CDIC Resolution Plan Guidance for Domestic Systemically Important Banks

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## Contents

Introduction .....	4
Guidance .....	5
Principles.....	5
Assumptions .....	5
Module 1 – Resolution Profile & Strategy.....	7
1.1 Resolution Profile .....	7
1.2 Resolution Strategy.....	9
Module 2 – Financial Feasibility Analysis.....	15
2.1 Introduction.....	15
2.2 General Assumptions – Resolution Scenario .....	15
2.3 Requirements – Resolution Scenario .....	17
Module 3 – Operational Plan.....	20
3.1 Crisis Preparedness Capabilities .....	21
3.2 Bail-In Execution.....	23
3.3 Valuation Capabilities in Resolution.....	31
3.4 Capabilities to Support Recapitalization & Funding Actions.....	36
3.5 Operational Continuity of Critical Shared Services .....	39
3.6 Continuity of Access to FMIs.....	40
3.7 Trading Book Wind-Down Plan .....	43
3.8 Key Regulators & Actions to Satisfy Regulatory Requirements.....	51
Module 4 – Resolution Plan Testing .....	52
4.1 Introduction.....	52
4.2 Requirements – D-SIB Testing Programs.....	52
4.3 Requirements – Joint Testing.....	55
Module 5 – Impediments and Work Plan .....	56
5.1 Impediments.....	56
5.2 Work Plan.....	57
Appendix A: Point of Entry.....	58

Appendix B: Definitions .....	60
Appendix C: Self-Assessment Template – Governance .....	65
Appendix D: Self-Assessment Template – Resourcing .....	67
Appendix E: Self-Assessment Template – Communications .....	69
Appendix F: Valuation Challenges in Resolution .....	71
Appendix G: Valuation Readiness Assessment Checklist .....	72
Appendix H: Self-Assessment Template – Liquidity and Funding .....	76
Appendix I: Operational Continuity Self-Assessment .....	79
Instructions for Operational Continuity Self-Assessment Template.....	79
Operational Continuity Self-Assessment Template.....	80
Appendix J: Trading Book Wind-Down Template .....	84
Schedule 1: Trading book profile - Segmentation.....	84
Schedule 2: Assignment of wind-down strategy.....	86
Schedule 3: Impact on liquidity and capital .....	86
Appendix K: Examples of Wind-Down Strategies .....	88
Appendix L: Work Plan Template .....	89
Appendix M: Suggested Table of Contents .....	90

## Introduction

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The resolution of a domestic systemically important bank (D-SIB, bank) in Canada, while a remote possibility, would be an unprecedented, and high consequence event. An important component of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation's (CDIC, the Corporation) preparedness for such an event is the development and maintenance of resolution plans for each of the banks<sup>1</sup>. CDIC considers it a priority to ensure that banks undertake the necessary work to create resolution plans, demonstrate feasibility, and address any impediments to ensuring their failure can be dealt with in an orderly fashion. These plans will serve as a tool to illustrate how each bank can be resolved through stabilization and restructuring processes without giving rise to significant economic disruption or exposing taxpayers and/or CDIC to loss.

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) set out the responsibilities and powers that countries should have in place to resolve large complex banks. These were endorsed by Canada with other G-20 countries and are known as the *Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions*. The objective of the Key Attributes is to allow authorities to resolve large complex banks in a manner that protects eligible deposits, maintains the flow of critical financial services, protects the economy, and minimizes risk to taxpayers.

Consistent with the G20 financial sector reform agenda aimed at addressing the factors that contributed to the 2008 global financial crisis, Canada has taken a number of steps to strengthen the banking sector and reduce the risk associated with bank failures. In 2017 the Federal Government made amendments to the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (CDIC Act)<sup>2</sup> to reflect CDIC's by-law making authority<sup>3</sup> and to designate CDIC as resolution authority<sup>4</sup>. CDIC's *Resolution Planning By-law* (By-law) came into force in May 2019. The By-law establishes a framework for the development, submission, and maintenance of resolution plans by the D-SIBs, and a process for highlighting and addressing deficiencies in those plans.

This guidance document represents the blue print for a comprehensive bank-authored resolution plan and documents CDIC's expectations and requirements, in accordance with the By-law. Amendments to this guidance document, in the form of technical notes, may transpire as work evolves and legislative developments occur.

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<sup>1</sup> Note that references to "bank" throughout this document are only in relation to the banks that are subject to the By-law (i.e., the D-SIBs) and refer to the "bank group" as defined in the By-law, s1.

<sup>2</sup> <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-3/>

<sup>3</sup> CDIC Act, paragraph 11(2)(e).

<sup>4</sup> CDIC Act, paragraph 7(d).

# Guidance

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CDIC has set out high-level guiding principles and assumptions to frame the bank's analysis and plan development.

## Principles

The following principles are intended to guide the overall tone and development of the plan.

- **Accountable:** The bank's Board of Directors is responsible for ensuring that a credible and feasible<sup>5</sup> resolution plan is in place and can be operationally implemented.
- **Strategic:** Strategically focused and reflects senior management's conclusions necessary to implement the strategy given the bank's unique legal, financial, and operational structure.
- **Comprehensive:** Applied to the comprehensive group and takes into account the characteristics of the bank including size, complexity, and geographic footprint.
- **Implementable:** Demonstrates how it can be practically implemented including the extent to which crisis management capabilities have been or can be tested.
- **Current:** Reflects the current state of the bank as well as the legal and regulatory framework in which it operates.

## Assumptions

The following assumptions underpin the plan development.

- **The bank has failed or is likely to fail, and resolution is necessary:**
  - Canadian D-SIB peers are experiencing stress but are able to demonstrate that the stress can be mitigated through their initial set of short-term recovery actions.
  - A combination of macroeconomic, market, and idiosyncratic events has triggered the implementation of the bank's recovery plan, but those actions have proved ineffective due to the size and speed of the stress. Limited recovery actions have been implemented. The bank has been more adversely affected than its D-SIB peers and meets the conditions for resolution.
  - The point of non-viability has been reached due to the inability of one or more material legal entities (MLE)<sup>6</sup> to meet capital, liquidity, or licensing requirements.

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<sup>5</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>6</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

The Superintendent of Financial Institutions forms an opinion that the D-SIB is no longer viable or about to become non-viable, it cannot be restored through the exercise of the Superintendent's powers, and he/she informs the CDIC Board. A Governor-in-Council (GIC) order is made authorizing CDIC to take control or ownership of the failed member (resolution entity) after the close of Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) followed by an announcement of the resolution strategy. If applicable, other domestic and foreign authorities apply their powers to the other resolution entities<sup>7</sup> as envisaged in the resolution strategy.

- **Rational actors:**

- All actors/stakeholders would act in accordance with these circumstances in their own self-interest, within the constraints of applicable legal regimes and contractual terms upon which they contract with the bank.
- The bank's regulators act in a manner consistent with their statutory objectives.
- There is a general lack of market confidence including, but not limited to, the following:
  - The bank's credit ratings have been downgraded to non-investment grade or withdrawn pending further announcements.
  - The bank's stakeholders (i.e. deposit holders, investors, financial market infrastructures (FMIs)<sup>8</sup>, counterparties) have lost confidence in its prospects to remain a going-concern and are taking actions to protect themselves and/or manage their exposures and risk.
  - The bank experiences a run on deposits in-line with the stressed condition of the bank.

It may be necessary for the bank to make additional assumptions to produce a credible resolution plan. Assumptions which are critical to the orderly resolution of the bank must be supported by well-founded legal, industry, market and/or historical justification. All necessary assumptions and the evidence for their justification should be explicitly recorded.

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<sup>7</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>8</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

# Module 1 – Resolution Profile & Strategy

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## 1.1 Resolution Profile

### 1.1.1 Introduction

The intent of the resolution profile is to provide a comprehensive view of the bank, identifying those material elements that, if not initially dealt with in resolution, could lead to a systemic disruption of financial stability. The profile should clearly and concisely describe the material elements of the bank, highlighting the critical functions<sup>9</sup> that it performs for the economy and financial system as well as the shared services that support those functions. Planning for the continuity of these functions and services upon entry to resolution should serve as the focus of the resolution strategy.

### 1.1.2 Requirements

Within the resolution strategy, the bank will be required to develop a set of actions to resolve the material elements of the bank. Given that resolution authorities apply their tools/powers at the legal entity level, the profile should provide a legal entity view of where these critical pieces of the bank are located. As a first step in the identification process, the bank will need to form a view of its critical functions and shared services. The bank should reference the FSB *Guidance on Identification of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Services* in identifying its critical functions and critical shared services<sup>10</sup>.

#### Critical functions

The bank should identify its critical functions and link them to the legal entities and lines of business that perform them. This analysis should identify critical functions in both home and host jurisdictions (where relevant)<sup>11</sup>.

#### Critical shared services

The bank should identify its critical shared services linking them to the critical functions they support and the legal entities that perform them.

#### Material legal entities

The bank should identify its material legal entities (MLEs) consistent with the definition provided in Appendix B and provide a brief description for each. The description should provide both qualitative and quantitative information relevant to resolving the entity:

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<sup>9</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>10</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>11</sup> Where host authorities have not yet gone through the process of identifying systemic banks operating within their jurisdiction, the bank should self-assess and identify a systemic presence/critical functions where relevant. Please refer to the FSB [Guidance on Cooperation and Information Sharing with Host Authorities](#), published on November 3, 2015.

- Information to understand scope
  - Jurisdiction of incorporation/operating jurisdiction
  - Critical functions/critical shared services performed
  - Ownership percentage
- Information to understand size
  - Basic financial information (assets, income, expenses)
  - Capital/liability structure
  - Intra-group guarantees or other support mechanisms
- Regulatory Information
  - Applicable protection schemes, supervisory, regulatory and resolution authorities
  - Relevant regulations and local regulatory/capital requirements

#### Mapping of material legal entities to simplified corporate structure chart

The bank is asked to plot its MLEs on a simplified corporate structure. The simplified corporate structure will facilitate the analysis to be performed in 1.2 – Resolution Strategy.

#### Legal entity structure review

Legal entity structure reviews must form part of the bank's ongoing resolution work as the bank's structure changes over time. As part of the bank's submissions, it will need to assess how the impact of any changes to its legal entity structure impacts the resolution strategy, such as any future changes to the bank's operations or organizational structure.



## 1.2 Resolution Strategy

### 1.2.1 Introduction

A feasible and effective resolution strategy should outline how CDIC and host resolution authorities could apply their resolution powers to avoid the destabilizing impact that would result from multiple competing insolvency regimes.

The bank's resolution strategy must be appropriate for the size, complexity, and geographic footprint of the bank. The strategy should link to the resolution profile and outline the approach for resolving the material elements of the bank.


A feasible and effective resolution strategy will:

- i. Set the strategic objectives for dealing with critical functions and associated MLEs;
- ii. Identify the preferred point(s) of entry into resolution in support of the strategic objectives;
- iii. Identify resolution tools that would be used by home and host authorities;
- iv. Outline stabilization options; and
- v. Outline options to restructure the bank to successfully exit from resolution.

### Resolution timeline

For the purpose of developing and sequencing the resolution strategy, a timeline and description of resolution periods has been provided.

**Figure I: Resolution timeline**



**Figure II: Description of the resolution periods**

Resolution period	Description
<b>Recovery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The period prior to the point of non-viability is covered in the bank's recovery plan. The bank has commenced recovery actions; however, those actions are proving ineffective due to the size and speed of the stress. Resolution should be thought of as a natural progression from an unsuccessful attempt to recover.</li> </ul>
<b>Point of non-viability and resolution weekend</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The point of non-viability has been reached due to the inability of one or more MLEs to meet capital, liquidity or licensing requirements.</li> <li>This is the period when the authorities execute the legal steps to place the failed D-SIB into resolution.</li> </ul>
<b>Stabilization</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stabilization occurs during the initial phase of a resolution in which the bank is recapitalized and when funding is available to support operations in-line with the objectives of the resolution strategy.</li> <li>The stabilization period is considered to be highly critical to the successful resolution of the bank and many of the necessary actions will be applicable regardless of the circumstances.</li> </ul>
<b>Restructuring</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The restructuring phase is the period in which the bank's business model is reconfigured with a view to developing a sustainable institution that can be returned to the private sector. This will involve the bank exiting from certain businesses, undertaking de-risking activities and disposing of assets.</li> <li>Actions taken during the restructuring period are substantially dependent on the circumstances facing the bank at the time of resolution.</li> </ul>

### 1.2.2 Requirements

#### Strategic objectives for critical functions and material legal entities

The bank is required to set high level objectives for critical functions and MLEs identified in the resolution profile. The objectives are intended to provide clarity into how those elements of the bank should be dealt with if the bank's ability to perform the function were to become impaired (due to severe financial distress) and/or MLEs were to become insolvent or deemed non-viable by their regulators.

The objectives should set a generalized course of action (both immediate and over the longer term) relevant to the critical functions and the MLEs in which those functions reside. The objectives at the functional and entity level should fit with the overarching objective of minimizing disruption to the broader financial system.

The strategic objectives should also outline the key dependencies or pre-conditions that would need to be in place for the objective to be achieved. Where these dependencies are detailed in other parts of the plan (e.g. resolution profile or as part of the recovery plan) then references should be made. The bank will be expected to demonstrate the extent to which these legal, financial or operational pre-conditions can be satisfied as part of its feasibility analysis (Module 2 – Financial Feasibility Analysis and Module 3 – Operational Plan). By first identifying objectives and understanding what needs to be in place to achieve those objectives, the feasibility and implementation of the broader plan can begin to be understood.

**Figure III: Illustrative example of critical function objectives**

Critical Function	Immediate Objective	Longer Term Objective	Key Dependencies to Achieve Objective
Retail Deposit Taking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain full customer access (branch, online, mobile, ATM network).</li> <li>Sufficient liquidity maintained to meet expected (run) outflow.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Function is viewed as core to the bank and would not be easily separable as a discrete divestiture.</li> <li>Longer term preservation of value would be defined by customer retention and competitive pricing.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Significant reliance on branch and technology infrastructure (including staff) to maintain operations (Refer to critical shared services section of profile).</li> <li>Access to emergency liquidity assistance (Refer to stabilization options below).</li> <li>Maintain access to payment clearing and settlement systems (Refer to Operational Plan).</li> </ul>
Trading Portfolio – Fixed Income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Achieve solvent wind-down.</li> <li>Parent entity would deploy capital and liquidity to keep broker/dealer solvent</li> <li>Enact stay provisions to avoid early termination of portfolio hedges.</li> <li>Flatten trading book, close shorts and begin orderly liquidation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Solvent wind-down of longer dated maturities.</li> <li>Novation of trades or movement of client positions to an alternate provider.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sufficient loss absorbency to recapitalize broker subsidiary (and avoid broker insolvency).</li> <li>Access to liquidity to close out positions and situate inventory for sale.</li> <li>Maintain access to key FMI and securities depositories.</li> <li>Contractual language that supports stay on termination for reasons of the bank entering resolution.</li> </ul>

For MLEs (beyond the parent bank) the objective should be stated in terms of whether:

- i. the entity (assuming it was deemed non-viable or insolvent) could enter the applicable winding-up or corporate insolvency regime without giving rise to broader systemic disruption or significant impairment to the parent bank, or
- ii. winding up/liquidation of the entity should be avoided, if at all possible, due to concerns as to the broader systemic consequences or risk of significant impairment to the parent bank.

Where option ii) is viewed as the best course of action, the bank should also describe how this could be accomplished through one or more of the following:

- i. deployment of capital and financial resources from the parent or other source, and/or
- ii. direct intervention by the applicable resolution authority.

**Figure IV: Illustrative example of material legal entity objectives**

Entity	Objective	Rational	Pre-Conditions
ABC Securities Inc.	<i>Deploy capital and funding from parent to keep the entity operational.</i>	<i>Entering corporate insolvency regime would have material destabilizing impact on brokerage clients and impede successful resolution of parent bank (due to multiple interlinkages).</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Sufficient loss absorbency/funding capacity at parent level to recapitalize/financially support subsidiary.</i></li> </ul>
US DTI	<i>Deploy capital and funding from parent to keep the entity operational (or) direct intervention by the applicable resolution authority (refer to US DTI resolution plan).</i>	<i>Primary focus would be to deploy parent funds to protect its US franchise (or) the US resolution regime for DTIs provides clear powers for FDIC to intervene and resolve non-viable DTIs.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Sufficient loss absorbency at parent level to recapitalize subsidiary.</i></li> <li><i>Continued provision of services from Canada to support US operations.</i></li> </ul>

### Point(s) of entry into resolution

The bank is required to detail a point of entry approach that supports the objectives set for its critical functions and MLEs.

Determination of the point(s) of entry is important to establish prior to the bank's entry into resolution given that each approach involves different levels of coordination and decision points amongst CDIC and host resolution authorities. Once the bank reaches the point of non-viability, resolution authorities will begin to take action and apply their tools at the resolution entity level.

The bank's plan should indicate its rationale for why the selected point(s) of entry approach supports the bank's strategic objectives, including:

- i. A determination of resolution entity/entities and resolution group(s)<sup>12</sup>. This involves assessing whether MLEs are to be resolved independently, as one whole group, or as multiple sub-groups. The bank should consider the level of operational and financial dependencies (both domestic and cross-jurisdictional) and other forms of inter-connectedness amongst critical functions and MLEs when deciding how the functions and entities will be resolved.
- ii. Identification of the points of entry for resolution. Appendix A provides an overview of the single point of entry (SPE) and multiple point of entry (MPE) approaches to resolution as provided by the FSB. Although Appendix A illustrates use of either an SPE or MPE approach, a combination of options that aligns with the bank's strategic objectives can also be discussed.

### Application of resolution tool(s)

The resolution strategy should identify the resolution tool(s) to be applied at the selected point(s) of entry, inclusive of all relevant domestic and foreign resolution regimes.

The bank's plan should address the following points:

- The resolution regimes/tools applicable to each point of entry, including the associated resolution authorities.
- A narrative on the sequencing of actions where tools are applied by multiple resolution authorities.
- The impacts/risks to the execution of the resolution strategy if there is a disruption in the sequencing of resolution actions.
- Impediments related to coordination/competing actions of various resolution authorities and the use of multiple resolution tools across the bank.

### Stabilization options

The bank is required to identify and describe options necessary to recapitalize and fund the bank in resolution. The options may vary depending on the chosen resolution tool. The feasibility of the bank to execute these options should be demonstrated in the operational plan.

The bank's plan should address the following points:

- Options for recapitalizing the bank;
- Whether potential impediments exist that could constrain the flow of capital and liquidity between parent and subsidiary/subsidiaries;
- Potential private and public sources of funding in resolution; and
- Possible constraints to accessing those sources of funding.

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<sup>12</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

## Restructuring options

This component of the resolution strategy will assist in developing a view of how the bank may look upon exit from resolution and help illustrate the degree to which the bank's level of systemic risk is reduced when the bank is returned to the market as a viable business.

The bank is required to outline:

- The scope of potential restructuring options across the remaining facets of the bank;
- The purpose of these options (orderly wind down, sale/divestiture, de-risking, other); and
- A high-level timeframe for the sequencing of options.

The feasibility of the bank to execute these actions should be demonstrated in the operational plan. It is expected that the proposed options will be leveraged from the bank's recovery plan; however, the bank must demonstrate that these restructuring options support the bank's resolution strategy and critical function/MLE objectives.

## Module 2 – Financial Feasibility Analysis

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### 2.1 Introduction

Through resolution planning, CDIC seeks to understand the spectrum of measures that may be necessary to stabilize a failed D-SIB and the capital and liquidity needs of the bank to maintain financial stability in Canada.

The bank's ability to demonstrate the financial feasibility of executing its resolution strategy, including minimizing reliance on public sector financial assistance and ensuring MLEs have access to sufficient loss absorbing capacity and liquidity, is a critical component of a credible resolution plan. In its resolution scenario analysis, the bank will need to model the potential resources needed to execute the resolution strategy under varying conditions.

### 2.2 General Assumptions – Resolution Scenario

This section provides general assumptions to guide the scenario. Additional assumptions used by the bank as part of the analysis should be explicitly identified in the submission.

#### Resolution runway

- There is a general lack of market confidence in the failing bank, including but not limited to, the following consequences:
  - The bank's credit ratings have been downgraded to non-investment grade or withdrawn pending further announcements.
  - The bank's stakeholders (i.e. deposit holders, investors, FMIs, counterparties) have lost confidence in its prospects to remain a going-concern and are taking actions to protect themselves and/or manage their exposures and risk.
  - The bank experiences a run on deposits in-line with the stressed condition of the bank.
  - The bank's regulators have evaluated that it no longer meets its licensing requirements.
- A resolution runway period of no more than 30 days may be assumed. If a shortened period is assumed, justification must be provided for the length of time and its appropriateness.
- With respect to recovery actions that could be taken, the bank may assume that recovery actions have commenced, but were not sufficient to prevent non-viability and did not result in material reduction to the bank's size, complexity, or interconnectedness. In this respect, it may be assumed that management actions have been taken during this period (such as liquidation of assets, attempts to raise market funding or restore the capital position), but these actions would not result in disposals of material business lines or a material reduction to the balance sheet size before the point of non- viability.

- Assumptions on the level of liquidity stress and deposit outflows are expected to be of a severity comparable to experiences observed internationally during the previous financial stress events, consistent with the condition of the bank, and should cause a breach of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) metric. However, the fall of the LCR metric below the 100 percent threshold alone should not be treated as an automatic resolution trigger. The bank should use its high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and optimize the use of all its available collateral to obtain liquidity.<sup>13</sup>
- Access to private sources of funding should be consistent with both the idiosyncratic liquidity stress and the macroeconomic scenario. During the runway period, the bank should assume that all new funding would be secured and short-term, and unsecured wholesale funding would not be available. The securitization programs should be assumed to behave in accordance with contractual terms and conditions, and sensitivity of the contractual terms and conditions to the stress events.
- The bank may assume availability of the Bank of Canada Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA)<sup>14, 15</sup> as a source of temporary public assistance, as long as sufficient eligible collateral is available.
- Given the resolution plan scenario contemplates a background of systemic stress (along with idiosyncratic shocks), the Bank of Canada's market-wide facilities can be assumed to be available to eligible institutions during the runway period. However, these facilities are not designed for institutions near or beyond the point of non-viability. Furthermore, once the bank accesses ELA, it should not assume continued use of market-wide facilities.

#### Point of non-viability to restructuring

- All contractual arrangements (including financial contracts, securitization structures, funding programs, FMI memberships, and service agreements) should be assumed to behave in accordance with contractual terms and conditions, and sensitivity of the contractual terms and conditions to the stress events and application of resolution tools.
- If not withdrawn during the resolution runway, the bank's credit ratings should be assumed to be withdrawn upon the entry to resolution. The credit ratings can be assumed to be reinstated when the bank in resolution satisfies the relevant requirements of each rating agency.
- The unsecured funding markets should be assumed to be unavailable, with net outflows continuing, until a resolution strategy is announced, and market confidence is regained.
- To the extent the bank's access to private-sector funding is insufficient to maintain the continuity of critical functions in resolution; it should be assumed that public-sector backstop mechanisms could be utilized as an alternative source of liquidity. In doing so, the bank must not assume the use of public-sector backstop mechanisms beyond those currently available under prevailing legislation. The bank should also clearly identify the assumptions made (e.g.,

<sup>13</sup> Refer to OSFI [Liquidity Adequacy Requirements](#).

<sup>14</sup> For terms and conditions of the Bank of Canada Emergency Lending Assistance, including eligible collateral and possible haircuts, the bank should refer to Bank of Canada's [Emergency Lending Assistance](#).

<sup>15</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.



haircut rates assumed in collateralized facilities or the use of mortgages as collateral). Such public-sector assistance should be considered temporary, and banks should demonstrate a full return to private sources of funding.<sup>16</sup> For clarity, no form of assistance from the Government of Canada, or any other government, may be assumed in a resolution plan.

## 2.3 Requirements – Resolution Scenario

The section outlines the general requirements for the scenario.

### Resolution scenario - narrative

The bank is required to provide a narrative outlining the sequencing of events and actions, serving as the foundation for the quantitative assessment of liquidity needs and recapitalization requirements during resolution.

### Resolution scenario - liquidity and funding position

This component of the scenario analysis focuses on demonstrating there is sufficient liquidity to achieve the stated objectives for critical functions and MLEs. The bank should first prioritize the use of internal liquidity sources to meet funding needs, to the extent possible. If public backstop mechanisms are resorted to, the bank must demonstrate the timely return to private funding sources.

The analysis should include explicit assumptions that are consistent with the stress scenario and triggers associated with the resolution events. In particular, the analysis should specify assumptions about:

- HQLA, liquidity outflows and inflows based on contractual terms, where applicable, supported by expert judgement to determine stakeholder behaviour under the stress scenario.
- Utilization of unencumbered assets and eligible collateral for central banks and other purposes.
- Counterparty actions associated with financial contracts subject to early termination or margin calls.
- Custodial arrangements and the need to return client assets.
- Asset maintenance requirements that may be imposed on branches in foreign jurisdictions.
- Increased liquidity needs for FMIs and intermediaries<sup>17</sup> and the peak usage of buffer for intra-day requirements.

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<sup>16</sup> The decision to activate and deactivate public sector funding sources, along with the ultimate sequencing of draws on public sector funding tools, will be ultimately determined by the authorities; however, for the purpose of the scenario analysis the banks may assume availability of Bank of Canada liquidity support programs designed for extraordinary circumstances, referred to in [Bank of Canada's Framework for Market Operations and Liquidity Provision](#), along with availability of CDIC temporary assistance, referred to in [CDIC Act](#) and subject to quantity of ex-ante fund and/or borrowing authority referred to in CDIC's public [Reports and disclosure](#).

<sup>17</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

The analysis should cover the following elements at each scenario milestone:

- A summary of the quantitative analysis of sources and uses of liquidity for selected MLEs or their groupings.<sup>18</sup> This analysis should consider:
  - Key drivers and / or triggers that create significant liquidity needs.
  - Impact of resolution on access to sources of liquidity and funding, including intra-group flows.
  - Amount of unencumbered assets available for pledging to central banks and other purposes.
  - Possible restrictions on the ability to transfer liquidity across MLEs during resolution based on: (i) legislative or regulatory restrictions that require approvals before execution; or (ii) restrictions based on conservative assumptions about regulatory actions that may prevent the cross-border liquidity flows.
  - Any other impacts associated with the scenario assumptions.
- A summary of the quantitative analysis of the potential funding gaps.
- A summary of the quantitative analysis of the funding gaps in the material currencies in which the bank operates.

To the extent possible, in the analysis, the bank's internal liquidity sources (e.g. cash and liquid assets available for sale or use as collateral that are held by the bank) need to be optimized to meet funding needs and the private markets must be the preferred source of funding.

Where results indicate that internal sources of liquidity are insufficient to cover liquidity needs, an inventory of possible funding options should be provided describing their applicability to meet the funding gap for each MLE. The inventory should identify:

- Credible funding options that could be available in resolution. The inventory should provide a two-track assessment distinguishing between funding options that would be available with and without temporary public-sector support.
- Quantum of funding generated and its timing.<sup>19</sup>
- Potential options for maintaining adequate liquidity in material currencies.
- Where collateralized facilities are envisioned, the options must include identification of the types of assets that could be rapidly sold or mobilized as collateral.
- Exit strategies from public sector backstop support and timing.

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<sup>18</sup> This information should be provided for the scope of MLEs agreed with CDIC.

<sup>19</sup> Specifically, in the case of Bank of Canada's Emergency Lending Assistance, the bank should account for potential time delays where mortgages are assumed to be provided as collateral.

### Resolution scenario - recapitalization needs

This component of the scenario analysis focuses on demonstrating that the resolution entity (or resolution entities, as applicable) has sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalization capacity available to: (i) stabilize the resolution group(s), (ii) ensure that its subsidiaries do not enter into separate insolvency proceedings (unless it is envisaged by the resolution strategy) and (iii) restore confidence in the institution while avoiding exposing taxpayers and/or CDIC to loss.

The analysis should include explicit assumptions consistent with the stress scenario and triggers associated with the resolution events. In particular, the analysis should specify assumptions about:

- Composition and location of total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC)<sup>20</sup> within the resolution group.
- Ability to upstream losses and downstream capital and any associated restrictions, considering local regulatory capital requirements and parent bank standalone capital considerations.
- Levels of realized losses that impact capital position.

The analysis should cover the following snapshots at each scenario milestone:

- A summary of the quantitative analysis of development of losses in the resolution group and maximum level of losses that can be absorbed at the parent bank (i.e. the resolution entity), supported by a snapshot of the balance sheet, regulatory capital ratios and levels of internal and external loss absorbency for selected MLEs<sup>21</sup>.
- Options for each resolution entity to generate additional loss absorbency in resolution, if losses incurred were higher than the available total loss absorbing capacity.
- Indicative losses that the shareholders and the different classes of creditors would face following the completion of the resolution strategy.

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<sup>20</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>21</sup> This information should be provided for the scope of MLEs agreed with CDIC.

## Module 3 – Operational Plan

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The operational plan should demonstrate how the resolution strategy is legally and operationally feasible, including crisis readiness and essential information needed to implement the plan. The operational plan should provide adequate analysis demonstrating the bank's capability to access information necessary for maintaining operational continuity in resolution as well as provide timely and accurate information to support CDIC's decision-making. It should clearly illustrate that placing the bank into resolution does not give rise to unmitigated risks to financial sector stability.

Development of the operational plan is an iterative process of self-assessing existing practices and capabilities necessary to execute the strategy and designing enhancements or removing impediments. The plan should include the identification of potential areas of internal validation or testing and their integration with the existing resolution plan testing programs (please refer to Module 4 – Resolution Plan Testing). Any impediments to effective execution of the resolution strategy should be captured and addressed in Module 5 – Impediments and Work Plan.

Included within Module 3 is guidance on the various components required to operationalize the resolution strategy. The subsequent sub-modules cover:

- i. Crisis preparedness capabilities;
- ii. Bail-in execution;
- iii. Valuation capabilities in resolution;
- iv. Capabilities to support recapitalization & funding actions;
- v. Operational continuity of critical shared services;
- vi. Continuity of access to FMIs;
- vii. Trading book wind-down plan; and
- viii. Key regulators & actions to satisfy regulatory requirements.

## 3.1 Crisis Preparedness Capabilities

### 3.1.1 Introduction

CDIC's readiness model is one that balances federal agency capacity with external standby arrangements, but ultimately relies on the operational resilience of the bank's people, processes, and technology (collectively, the bank's capabilities). Due to this reliance, it is critical that CDIC build its readiness in parallel with the bank's readiness capacity, and with a full understanding of each bank's existing crisis management capabilities and planned enhancements.

### 3.1.2 Governance

CDIC will take temporary control (or ownership) of the member institution upon entry into resolution and will remain accountable for the execution of the resolution strategy. However, CDIC will rely on the expertise that resides within the bank to make informed decisions and rely on the bank's capabilities for execution of the resolution strategy. CDIC would establish a resolution management office that would have the central accountability and responsibility for overseeing the execution and coordination of all activities associated with the resolution strategy. This would be the primary point of contact for the bank in resolution.

#### 3.1.2.1 Requirements – governance

The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's ability to maintain continuity of governance processes in the transition to, and through, resolution as well as an understanding of the bank's key roles and responsibilities in executing the resolution strategy.

The plan should address the following areas in support of the strategy:

- The bank can activate its financial crisis response teams and governance protocol for resolution in coordination with CDIC.
- The roles and responsibilities and relationship to CDIC are clear and understood within the organization.
- CDIC can install a new (or transitional) Board of Directors and executive management while upholding corporate governance requirements to the extent possible.

Please refer to Appendix C for the governance self-assessment template.

### 3.1.3 Resourcing

Execution of the resolution strategy relies on the availability and retention of key employees of the bank in resolution. Effective resourcing enables the resolution strategy when:

- CDIC can rely on existing processes in place to identify and communicate with key employees across the enterprise in a timely manner and at potentially short notice.
- Key employees can be retained (to the extent possible) to support the execution of the resolution strategy.

### 3.1.3.1 Requirements – resourcing

The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's ability to retain key employees and teams throughout the resolution period. The plan should address how the following support the implementation of the strategy:

- Process for identification and communication with key employees during resolution.
- Possible retention approaches and strategies for key employees in resolution.

Please refer to Appendix D for the resourcing self-assessment template.

### 3.1.4 Communication

Stabilization of the bank in resolution is contingent on the ability to make timely statements to the markets and the public, to instill confidence in the bank and the credibility of the resolution strategy. While public authorities will lead the communication strategy, the effective execution of crisis communication relies on CDIC leveraging the bank's capabilities.

An effective resolution communications strategy:

- Is well-coordinated between the safety net authorities and the D-SIB (e.g. timing and content of messages, as applicable);
- Employs relevant channels with monitoring capabilities; and
- Provides customers, regulatory authorities, depositors, creditors, employees, vendors, rating agencies, and key counterparties with timely, transparent, and appropriately detailed information on the resolution process.

#### 3.1.4.1 Requirements – communication

The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's preparedness for managing internal and external communications throughout the resolution period, including:

- A communication plan that covers resolution-specific stakeholder analysis (e.g. objective/desired outcome, risks, messages, and channels for each stakeholder group), communications infrastructure and contacts CDIC could leverage.
- Processes to issue communications (e.g. message development and approval) including a proposal on how it would integrate the role of CDIC.
- Mechanisms in place to review, test, and evaluate the bank's crisis communications specific to a financial crisis.

Please refer to Appendix E for the communications self-assessment template.

## 3.2 Bail-In Execution

### 3.2.1 Introduction

This section of the plan is intended to address the operational aspects of the bail-in tool ensuring that a resolution strategy using the bail-in tool is credible and the bank is operationally prepared to support the execution of the bail-in tool.

This guidance draws on principles described in the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) *Principles on Bail-in Execution*.<sup>22</sup>

### 3.2.2 Scope

The bank is to include the required information in a Bail-in Execution Playbook (bail-in playbook) that covers both Canada and foreign jurisdictions. The bank has flexibility in the manner it presents and organizes information in its bail-in playbook.

The bail-in playbook should include all the information required by the guidance, including describing the actions and information that are required to effect a bail-in conversion and the implications of securities law and securities exchange requirements in a bail-in resolution.

The bank is expected to include information in its bail-in playbook for those jurisdictions which account for 95% or greater of the bank's total amount of outstanding bail-inable debt that has been issued (the coverage threshold)<sup>23</sup>. Although this will vary by bank, outside of Canada, CDIC expects this will likely include the United States, relevant countries in Europe, and the United Kingdom.

### Stakeholder consultation

To the extent that consultations are needed to inform the development of the bail-in playbook, CDIC expects that the bank will engage with relevant domestic and foreign stakeholders.

In order to assess preparedness and accuracy of the information presented on bail-in execution, CDIC may share sections of a bank's bail-in playbook with relevant domestic and foreign stakeholders to confirm the information provided and the reasonableness of any assumptions made.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.2.3 Bail-in Conversion Assumptions

Information on the bail-in tool in Canada and CDIC's approach to bail-in execution can be found on CDIC's website.<sup>25,26</sup> This information lays out the legal framework for the bail-in tool and describes

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<sup>22</sup> Financial Stability Board, *Principles on Bail-in Execution* – <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P210618-1.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> CDIC will review the coverage threshold on an ongoing basis to ensure that there is sufficient operational information on bail-in debt issuances in foreign jurisdictions. As the banks' bail-in issuance programs mature, CDIC may revisit its approach.

<sup>24</sup> To address any confidentiality concerns, D-SIBs could: provide letters/confirmations from external stakeholders on process, information requirements and key steps avoiding the need for CDIC to onward share with that stakeholder; structure the bail-in playbook to only include non-confidential information; or, when submitting its bail-in playbook, indicate which sections they are not comfortable with CDIC onward sharing.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/resolution/Pages/how-bail-in-works.aspx>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.cdic.ca/en/about-cdic/resolution/Pages/execution-of-the-bail-in-tool.aspx>

the various stages of a bail-in resolution, including the actions or events that might take place at each stage.

As the CDIC Act provides CDIC with the flexibility to determine the portion of bail-in debt to be converted into common shares, as well as the timing of a conversion, CDIC expects the bank to have the operational capabilities to support several bail-in scenarios, including situations where a bail-in conversion occurs quickly.

The manner in which CDIC would effect a bail-in conversion in a resolution would depend on the circumstances at the time. However, to assist in the development of the bail-in playbook, the following assumptions should be made:<sup>27,28</sup>

- **CDIC control/ownership:** CDIC would take control of the D-SIB using the Share Enhanced-Financial Institution Restructuring Powers (E-FIRP) provisions of the CDIC Act, which would result in all outstanding common shares and non-Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC) preferred shares and subordinate debt vesting in CDIC at the time of the GIC order.
- **NVCC conversion:** Immediately after CDIC takes control of the D-SIB, the Superintendent of Financial Institutions announces that the conditions have been met to trigger the NVCC conversion.
- **Valuation:** At the time of the GIC order, sufficient valuation information exists to allow CDIC to determine the size of the loss and conversion terms for the bail-in debt.
- **Timing:** The bail-in conversion would be executed over a weekend. This means that the bail-in conversion terms would be announced by CDIC during the resolution weekend.
- **Reporting:** A bail-in resolution would occur off-cycle and mid-month in a financial reporting period, such that information on the scope of bail-in instruments would need to be updated and business as usual reporting processes would have to be adjusted.

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<sup>27</sup> CDIC may choose to implement the bail-in tool differently than as set out under these assumptions and the approach described should not be viewed as CDIC's preferred approach to a bail-in resolution.

<sup>28</sup> Regardless of whether the conversion occurs over the resolution weekend or is delayed, the information requirements and processes to facilitate bail-in are largely the same, but with different time constraints.



### 3.2.4 Bail-in Execution Playbook

The bank is required to include the following information in its bail-in playbook.

#### 3.2.4.1 Summary of the overall plan for bail-in execution

This section should include:

- A description of the bank's overall plan to manage and support bail-in execution. This would include a description of the bank's capabilities to execute such plan (i.e. processes, personnel, management structure, timing, and systems).
- A summary of any impediments related to bail-in execution, including how these impediments could be addressed and an overall conclusion on the bank's ability to execute the bail-in tool.

The development of this section should be informed by the specific bail-in execution information required below.

#### 3.2.4.2 Information on bail-in debt issuances and other information

Covering all bail-in debt issuances, the D-SIB is required to provide the following information in its bail-in playbook:<sup>29</sup>

- A list of the jurisdictions in which instruments within the scope of the Bail-in Guidance have been issued.<sup>30</sup>
- A breakdown of the total size and frequency of issuances of each type of instrument in each of the jurisdictions the instruments have been issued.

For those issuances falling within the coverage threshold (i.e. 95%):

- A description of the issuance programs (e.g. medium-term notes, certificates of deposit, structured notes, etc.) and the forms of the instruments (e.g. global certificate, dematerialized, physical, registered or bearer forms) that are issued in each jurisdiction.
- The relevant market participants<sup>31</sup> in each jurisdiction and a brief description of the role that participants would have in bail-in execution.
- Any other bail-in execution information specific to the jurisdiction in which instruments are issued.

The D-SIB should use the information provided to OSFI and CDIC in the Capital and TLAC Planning Template as a base for providing the information in this section.

<sup>29</sup> This information is based on actual issuances.

<sup>30</sup> Instruments include: common shares, non-viability contingent capital (NVCC), non-NVCC preferred shares and subordinated debt, and bail-in debt. Information on these instruments is required as they would be impacted by bail-in and other related actions such as CDIC's use of Share E-FIRP powers in a bail-in resolution.

<sup>31</sup> These could include: central securities depositories, international central securities depositories, common depositories, registrars, paying agents, fiscal agents, transfer agents, trustees, settlement systems, and exchanges, as applicable. Collectively referred to as "relevant market participants" in this document.

To aid in the development of the bail-in playbook through the transition period to fully meeting TLAC requirements, the D-SIB is asked to identify jurisdictions that may fall within the coverage threshold following the transition period and provide a brief explanation of why those jurisdictions may fall within the coverage threshold in the future.

#### 3.2.4.3 Systems and processes to provide data

At the time of a resolution, CDIC will need an accurate measure of the loss absorbing capacity of the bank. CDIC will also need information about the scope of all instruments that may be impacted by a bail-in resolution and other related actions (i.e. Share E-FIRP as a pre-requisite to bail-in).

The bank is required to have the systems and processes in place to produce complete and accurate information on all instruments that would be impacted in a bail-in resolution within 24 hours of a resolution order being issued to facilitate a possible weekend resolution. Specifically, the bank should be able to produce up-to-date information on all instruments that are eligible to be bailed-in on an instrument-by-instrument basis as requested by OSFI and CDIC in the Capital and TLAC Planning Template.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the D-SIB is also required to have the ability to calculate the accrued interest on each instrument and the amount of any declared and unpaid dividends for all instruments within 24 hours of receipt of notice from CDIC.

To demonstrate the above capabilities, the bank is required to describe the processes that it will use to track and produce key information related to the scope of instruments that would be impacted by a bail-in resolution. The D-SIB should also describe the level of accuracy, the amount of internal review and the governance procedures related to producing the information.

As part of its internal preparedness, CDIC conducts its own internal analysis/testing to ensure that it is prepared to execute a bail-in. As part of this process, CDIC may reach out to the D-SIB in the future regarding the availability of additional information.

#### 3.2.4.4 Conversion mechanics

At a high level, this section is designed to:

- Describe the sequence of steps that would be needed to execute the bail-in conversion and other related actions, including identifying the information requirements of relevant market participants.
- Demonstrate capabilities to facilitate the steps and provide information required by relevant market participants to execute the bail-in conversion and other related actions.

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<sup>32</sup> At a high-level, this template includes information on an instrument-by-instrument basis providing: security identifiers (ISINs or CUSIPs), outstanding amounts, currencies, jurisdiction of issuance, governing law, the form of the instrument and information about relevant market participants.

## Identification of steps

Conversion mechanics refers to the process by which instruments eligible to be bailed-in would be converted into common shares of the bank. As set out on CDIC's website, CDIC will use existing market technology and conventions primarily used by central securities depositories to convert liabilities and deliver common shares to bailed-in creditors.

As the conversion mechanism will rely on existing market technologies and conventions, the bail-in playbook should describe and provide an overall timeline of the sequential steps and processes that would be required to effect the bail-in conversion in each jurisdiction. Given the number of market participants involved in a bail-in execution, the identification of steps and/or processes should not only include those that are internal to the bank but also those of relevant market participants that the bank would interact with to effect the bail-in conversion.

As part of developing an understanding of the specific steps and/or processes that would be followed in a bail-in, it is expected that the D-SIB will engage with the relevant market participants in the development of the bail-in playbook.<sup>33</sup> These participants and their roles may vary across jurisdictions based on the manner and form that debt is issued. A key component of the information expected to be included in the bail-in playbook is the identification of any differences in these steps across jurisdictions.

At a minimum, the bail-in playbook should include a description of the following steps:

- The steps the D-SIB would take to notify relevant market participants of its entry into resolution.<sup>34</sup>
- The steps the D-SIB would take:
  - internally to reflect the transfer of outstanding common shares and non-NVCC preferred shares or subordinated debt to CDIC in the case of Share E-FIRP;
  - to provide instructions to depositories to reflect the transfer of shares and other instruments in CDIC.
- The processes for communicating instructions to depositories and other market participants to halt dividend, interest or principal payments, including unpaid redemptions amounts, following entry into resolution.
- The steps the D-SIB would take to convert NVCC instruments.
- A description of the process the D-SIB would take to provide instructions to depositories to reflect the conversion terms determined by CDIC on an instrument-by-instrument basis (i.e. the number of shares that will be provided for each liability). This process should include a description of calculating accrued interest and foreign currency conversions for each

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<sup>33</sup> To assist in bail-in preparedness, D-SIBs may wish to consider entering into protocols, playbooks or other forms of agreement with relevant market participants.

<sup>34</sup> This will involve a determination of whether the depositories wish to receive instructions directly from CDIC, or from the D-SIB or relevant direct participant (CDIC understands that some depositories will only accept instructions directly from participants).

instrument. This should also include the process to amend global notes (i.e., to zero in the case of a full conversion or to the appropriate proportion in the case of a partial conversion) or modify book entries.

- The internal processes for issuing new common shares to NVCC and bail-in debt holders, including the creation and delivery of new global certificates to depositories (or the modification of book entries) in all relevant jurisdictions.
- The instructions that would be provided to depositories at CDIC exit to inform shareholders of the return of their voting rights.

For each step of the bail-in process, the bank is required to include a description of the specific information required by relevant market participants to facilitate each action.

As part of the above descriptions, the bail-in playbook should demonstrate that the bank has considered the following:

- How unsettled transactions would be treated following entry into resolution or a description of depositories capabilities in this regard.
- How the D-SIB's systems and processes to effect the conversion consider the legal forms of the securities affected by bail-in resolution.<sup>35</sup>
- The information, format and manner in which the list of impacted securities and conversion terms are to be provided to depositories.
- Whether there are any added complexities associated with a partial conversion, and, if so, a description of how the processes or information requirements might differ from a full conversion.
- Whether the new shares issued as a result of the conversion meet all requirements of depositories (e.g. eligibility criteria).
- Contact information of relevant market participants that would be needed for purposes of bail-in execution and a process to keep this information up to date.

### 3.2.4.5 Securities law and securities exchange requirements

The bank is required to include in its bail-in playbook a description of the implications of securities law and securities exchange requirements in a bail-in resolution.<sup>36</sup> The scope of the considerations in this section relates to all instruments that are distributed (publicly or privately), held, listed, and/or traded on an exchange in a jurisdiction within the scope of the Bail-in Guidance. These considerations should be developed in consultation with securities authorities in each jurisdiction.

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<sup>35</sup> It is understood that most securities impacted by a bail-in are held through depositories and are cleared and settled. However, there may be some situations where securities are held in physical form or are not registered at depositories. Where this is the case, D-SIBs should also have processes in place to identify these holders, inform them of the impacts of a bail-in resolution (i.e. for common shares the suspension of voting rights and potential vesting in CDIC) and effect the conversion.

<sup>36</sup> For the bail-in playbook, D-SIBs can utilize previous work done with Canadian securities regulators, the TSX and IIROC on the securities implications in bail-in execution.

At a high level, this section of the bail-in playbook is designed to:

- Identify the main securities law and securities exchange requirements that are relevant in a bail-in resolution in each jurisdiction.
- Describe the D-SIB's approach and capabilities to comply with the requirements, including the use of any exemptions or extensions.
- Identify the implications of failing to comply with the requirements.
- Identify any actions to mitigate the impact of failing to comply with any requirements.

#### Identification of securities law and securities exchange requirements in a bail-in

It is generally expected that the D-SIB will comply with securities law and securities exchange requirements at all stages of a bail-in resolution. The D-SIB is required to identify and briefly describe the main securities law and securities exchange requirements that may be difficult to comply with in a bail-in resolution.

For example, within a Canadian context this could include (but is not limited to):<sup>37</sup>

Securities law:

- Continuous disclosure obligations and publication of material change reports
- Take-over bid, insider reporting, and early warning reporting requirements
- Requirements for distributing new common shares

Exchange requirements:

- Continuous listing requirements
- Timely disclosure requirements
- Listing requirements for new common shares

#### Plan to comply with securities law and exchange requirements

The bank should describe its approach to complying with the identified rules and requirements a bail-in resolution, including disclosure requirements and requirements related to the distribution of new shares. The D-SIB should identify and describe any exemptions or extensions from securities law or exchange requirements that it would rely on and the situations or factors that would be considered in their application.

To the extent that securities law and exchange requirements may differ across jurisdictions, the D-SIB should describe how it intends to co-ordinate its actions with respect of these potentially differing requirements.

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<sup>37</sup> In this section the terminology used is based on Canadian securities law and exchange requirements. The use of this terminology should not limit the requirements of the Bail-in Guidance for other jurisdictions where there may be similar concepts using different terminology.

The D-SIB should also describe whether a consistent approach to the listing and trading of the D-SIB's securities would be pursued across jurisdictions while in resolution – for example, the D-SIB should consider whether it would seek to facilitate trading in the same jurisdictions as prior to resolution or would focus on facilitating trading in fewer jurisdictions.

### Implications and mitigants for failing to comply with identified requirements

The bank should include a description of the consequences of failing to meet identified securities law and exchange requirements, including whether the failure to meet certain requirements may result in a cease trade order (CTO), trading suspensions or de-listing from exchanges or other actions in a particular jurisdiction. This discussion should consider the full range of instruments that could be impacted by broad cease trade orders.<sup>38</sup>

The D-SIB should also include a discussion on how these securities and exchange implications (e.g. a CTO) could impact its overall resolution strategy, including its access to funding and liquidity, ability to absorb or contain losses, market communications, etc.

The D-SIB should include a description of any mitigants to undesirable outcomes for failing to comply with any securities requirements. For instance, to the extent the D-SIB's securities may be subject to a CTO, the D-SIB should provide a description and justification for potential carve outs for particular trades from a CTO or the use of a Management CTO that may support its resolution strategy or more easily allows steps in a bail-in execution.

### 3.2.4.6 Identification of potential impediments and testing

The capabilities described in this section should be considered for inclusion in resolution plan testing programs. Testing exercises will be an important component in validating the capabilities to produce the required data.

Where the bank has not developed the operational capabilities related to specific requirements or has been unable to fully consider all issues required, its work plan should include a description of the actions required to develop the necessary capabilities and the corresponding approach to testing such capabilities, where appropriate.

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<sup>38</sup> CDIC recognizes that this requirement goes beyond the scope of bail-inable instruments and could include securities such as eligible financial contracts (EFCs), covered bonds, or short-term funding. As the securities implications, impacts, as well as mitigating actions related to these instruments are similar to bail-in debt, CDIC expects that these issues should be considered together in the bail-in playbook.

## 3.3 Valuation Capabilities in Resolution

### 3.3.1 Introduction


The objective of the D-SIB resolution planning work on valuation is to develop the appropriate level of readiness, ensuring the bank's people, system output, information, mark-to-market models, and internal controls can be leveraged to support various types of valuations in resolution with an emphasis on the valuations required to support an immediate bail-in conversion.

### 3.3.2 Types of Valuations in Resolution

CDIC expects that multiple valuations will be carried out in a bail-in resolution at different points in time by a qualified valuator to inform CDIC's decisions throughout the resolution process. Valuations will be critical to informing the amount of bail-in debt to convert (as driven by the size of the expected loss), the terms for conversion, the exit strategy, and the determination of whether creditors were made worse off in resolution than in liquidation.

In all cases, it is expected that CDIC would retain external valuation experts to perform the valuations on behalf of CDIC, leveraging the D-SIB's valuation capabilities to the maximum extent possible.

**Figure V: Types of valuations in resolution**



<sup>39</sup> The CDIC Act and associated regulations provide CDIC with broad flexibility in determining how the bail-in tool should be implemented, including determining the method of taking control or ownership, the timing of conversion, whether the conversion takes place in one or more steps, the amount of bail-in debt to be bailed-in, and the conversion terms. This illustrative timeline reflects a target state of readiness that enables bail-in conversion to occur immediately, within 48 hours of entry to resolution.

### Valuation 1: Pre-resolution preparedness

A preliminary valuation would commence as early as possible in the lead up to resolution to inform CDIC's recommendations to take control and to estimate its exposure to loss. Significant reliance would be placed on the bank's valuation capabilities at this stage. In the lead up to resolution, it is anticipated that financial instruments and other assets (e.g., banking book assets, business lines) would be fair valued with increased frequency and rigor to support the execution of the bank's liquidity and capital recovery actions.

### Valuation 2: Bail-in conversion amount and terms

The requirement to maintain adequate capital when carrying out a bail-in conversion is intended to ensure that the bank emerges from the bail-in conversion appropriately recapitalized to facilitate returning the D-SIB to viability and restoring market confidence. The recapitalization amount will be informed by an estimate of the incurred and expected losses as of the GIC order date, and therefore will require valuations (balance sheet and enterprise) to be conducted at that point in time.<sup>40</sup>

As envisaged by bail-in regimes in other jurisdictions, it would be prudent for CDIC to include a conservatism buffer when signaling the upper end of the loss and determining the conversion amount, to account for the constraints inherent in preparing a complex valuation in a short period of time in distressed market conditions. To avoid the risk of over bail-in, valuers will need to ensure the buffer is not overly conservative or unnecessarily large. Based on CDIC's consultation with third party valuation experts, an immediate valuation would only be feasible if: (a) there is sufficient lead time pre-resolution to begin the valuation or (b) the loss is contained to a single asset class. In both cases, the bank must have reliable capabilities and information in place to support the valuation.

Consistent with the target state of readiness set forth in Module 3.2 Bail-in Execution, a D-SIB should have the capabilities to support a bail-in conversion within 48 hours of entry into resolution.

### Valuation 3: Opening balance sheet, post-conversion

Once CDIC takes control and completes the bail-in conversion, counterparties, investors, credit rating agencies, and securities regulators will be looking for updated and accurate balance sheet data for the recapitalized bank. The responsibility for financial statement reporting in resolution would continue to reside with the D-SIB, and the bank will need to understand the information that will be required to restore market confidence and have a plan in place to meet those demands.

### Valuation 4: Exit strategy

An enterprise valuation<sup>41</sup> (whole bank or single business lines) would assess the viability of the resolved entity and, along with other information, inform the timing and manner in which CDIC exits from resolution (up to 5 years after entry).

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<sup>40</sup> The conversion amount would be informed by a balance sheet valuation, which involves conducting a separate valuation of each asset and liability, including material business lines or subsidiaries. A balance sheet valuation is regarded as an extension of accounting and regulatory frameworks and as such should be consistent with IFRS and regulatory capital requirements. An enterprise valuation (e.g. which might involve the use of multiples or enterprise level cash flows) would provide an important soundness check on the reasonability of CDIC's conversion decisions.

<sup>41</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.



### Valuation 5: No Creditor Worse Off

As described in the *Compensation Regulation*<sup>42</sup>, the No Creditor Worse Off safeguard involves comparing a hypothetical liquidation value<sup>43</sup> to a resolution value. Compensation would be owed to impacted shareholders and creditors if the estimated liquidation value of their investment exceeded the estimated resolution value. The resolution value would reflect an enterprise valuation, prepared on a going-concern basis as of the exit date, whereas the liquidation value would be prepared on a gone-concern basis as of the resolution entry date. The compensation process would begin when CDIC issues a notice published in the Canada gazette and the bank's website that CDIC is no longer in control.

***The focus of CDIC's resolution planning efforts is to ensure readiness for "Valuation 2: Bail-in Conversion Amount and Terms".***

#### 3.3.3 Valuation Challenges in Resolution

The valuation challenges associated with resolution are well recognized internationally and converge on the broad themes of:

- unprecedented size and stress,
- complexity of asset portfolios,
- wide-scale use of derivatives,
- distressed market conditions and
- speed.

While some valuation challenges can be mitigated with additional time and resources, others present inherent challenges irrespective of the length of time taken to complete the exercise (for example, the impacts of market illiquidity on asset valuations would present challenges in either an immediate or delayed conversion scenario). The challenges associated with a bail-in valuation are summarized in Appendix F.

#### 3.3.4 Resolution Plan Requirements

##### 3.3.4.1 Resolution valuation readiness checklist

CDIC's approach to valuation in resolution is founded on the premise that the banks regularly fair value<sup>44</sup> financial instruments (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly) and other assets (e.g. banking book assets) to meet existing regulatory requirements, statutory reporting and internal financial and risk management standards. In resolution, significant reliance will be placed on the bank to have in place well documented and clear processes for valuation such that a third party can review and challenge the valuation. In some cases, a 'ground up' valuation or independent valuation conducted by a third party for certain portfolios or instruments will be necessary. However, the first objective should be

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2018/2018-04-18/html/sor-dors59-eng.html>

<sup>43</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>44</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

for the bank to provide the information necessary for a third party to assess the reasonableness of the valuation approach and results.<sup>45</sup>

The **Valuation Readiness Assessment Checklist** in Appendix G contains a list of information required by a third-party valuator to conduct the balance sheet and enterprise valuations required for an immediate conversion. While much of the information in the list could be gathered in the lead up to resolution, some of the information would need to be updated upon entry to resolution to ensure the conversion decision captures all incurred and expected losses as of the GIC date. The bank should assess its ability to produce the information required to announce conversion within a 48-hour timeframe, consistent with the target state of readiness set forth in Module 3.2 Bail-in Execution.

The bank should maintain an updated valuation readiness assessment checklist as part of its annual resolution plan and indicate which subject matter experts were involved in the preparation and review of the checklist.

In completing the checklist, the D-SIB should consider the following:

- i. The checklist is dual purpose: (1) it assesses which information must be updated over the weekend as compared to information that can be gathered in the lead up to resolution; and, (2) it assesses whether that information can be made available and relied upon within 48-hours.
- ii. The 48-hour valuation is needed to signal an upper loss estimate (inclusive of a valuation buffer for conservatism) over the weekend and/or support an immediate conversion.
- iii. The loss estimate is prepared on a going concern basis (not a liquidation basis), consistent with an open bank strategy.
- iv. The valuation capabilities under assessment do not necessarily equate to producing full financial statements with note disclosures. However, if the D-SIB's resolution strategy or funding strategy assumes (or implies) that counterparties, regulators, investors, credit rating agencies, would have access to any key financial data immediately (e.g. capital ratios), this should be reflected in the D-SIB's readiness assessment.
- v. The bank should assume there is time in the lead up to resolution to begin valuation activities and should disclose what assumptions were necessary to support its assessment.
- vi. The D-SIB should assume losses are pervasive to all asset classes reflecting a level of stress that is consistent with the assumptions defined by CDIC in the scenario guidance.
- vii. It may not be possible to achieve the same level of precision in a 48-hour timeframe under highly stressed conditions as would be required for business as usual reporting. However, there will need to be sufficient quality and rigor around the bail-in valuation such that the

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<sup>45</sup> For greater clarity, the D-SIBs will need to have the capability to perform the valuation (not simply provide the underlying data). The valuation performed by the D-SIB will be reviewed by a third-party expert, engaged by CDIC; this approach does not preclude CDIC from reaching an independent view on the loss.

accompanying decisions taken would not be meaningfully different had more time been available. There will be some subjectivity required in completing the checklist; the D-SIB should define the assumptions it makes regarding rigor and quality of information and explain how the assumptions differ from business as usual within the checklist.

#### 3.3.4.2 Mitigating valuation challenges

The resolution plan should identify the key risks and challenges of valuations in resolution, particularly in the context of an immediate conversion.

- i. The D-SIB should review the list of challenges listed in Appendix F for completeness, identifying any additional challenges. The list should take into consideration the results of the valuation checklist assessment and any additional challenges identified through that process.
- ii. The bank should identify its high-risk valuation areas (asset classes, portfolios, instruments) that are inherently subject to higher valuation uncertainty or volatility and that, due to their balance sheet significance, could materially impact the estimate of losses.

The bank's resolution plan should identify mitigating strategies for each challenge and higher risk valuation area:

- i. Describe if and how the valuation challenges could be mitigated in crisis.
- ii. Propose ex-ante readiness measures that could either mitigate the challenges described above or expedite the valuation analysis.

#### 3.3.4.3 Testing

The D-SIB should design and complete valuation capability tests to validate the results of the valuation readiness assessment completed for the preceding resolution plan and effectiveness of any workarounds. The D-SIB should submit all related test documentation to CDIC for review, including the test proposal (defining objectives, scope, participants, scenario, expected results, etc., in advance of the exercise) and report on findings once the test is completed.

#### 3.3.4.4 Workplan

The D-SIB's workplan should be updated to reflect the outcome of the work and testing exercises performed in sections 3.3.4.1-3.3.4.3.

## 3.4 Capabilities to Support Recapitalization & Funding Actions

### 3.4.1 Introduction

CDIC views the ability of the bank to reliably model financial impacts of resolution stress and resolution actions on MLEs an important aspect of achieving resolvability. The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's capabilities to:

- Identify, estimate, monitor and report on financial resources (i.e. capital and liquidity needs) for MLEs and material branches;
- Execute options to generate adequate funding in resolution; and
- Downstream capital and liquidity to MLEs in a timely manner and upstream losses.

The bank's capabilities should be validated through testing exercises, with CDIC's expectations outlined in Module 4 – Resolution Plan Testing.

### 3.4.2 Requirements - Recapitalization Actions

As part of the operational plan, the bank should demonstrate the ability to recapitalize regulated MLEs in a timely manner to prevent detrimental regulatory actions. To achieve this, the bank should describe the steps for recapitalizing each MLE, under a resolution context, for each form of recapitalization (e.g. write-down of inter-company debt instruments, equity injection), along with the analysis of any potential legal and operational impediments to doing so. As part of this work, the bank should consider an MLE's position in its legal structure, required regulatory communications and other operational factors needed to support recapitalization actions, in addition to other factors identified by the bank.

### 3.4.3 Requirements - Funding Actions

Resolution puts significant pressure on the bank's ability to meet liquidity needs. Recapitalization is not by itself sufficient to ensure continuity of the bank's critical functions if the bank cannot maintain access to liquidity to refinance its liabilities as they fall due. To ensure there is sufficient funding and liquidity available for the bank in resolution, a credible resolution strategy must be supported by operational capabilities allowing the bank to:

- Estimate, monitor and report on funding needs for MLEs and material branches with reasonable precision and speed in a resolution stress;
- Manage liquidity/collateral in resolution; and
- Execute funding strategies (including the provision of liquidity to MLEs).

The operational plan should demonstrate the effectiveness of the bank's operational capabilities (processes, personnel, and technology) to manage funding and liquidity necessary to allow MLEs to continue operating in resolution. The plan should address the following areas in support of the strategy:

- Processes for estimating funding needs upon entry to resolution to enable CDIC to understand the cash flow position of MLEs before and during a resolution. This could be achieved in the form of a contractual maturity ladder to identify the gaps between inflows and outflows using time buckets for MLEs on an individual currency, consistent with NCCF reporting.
- Capabilities to identify funding concentrations by counterparty, instrument, or product where withdrawals and/or rating downgrades could trigger liquidity issues, drawing on the analysis contained in the recovery plans.
- Capabilities and tools to monitor intraday liquidity needs by MLE.
- Capabilities to track relevant payments, clearing and settlement activities, including customers and counterparties, transaction volumes, credit capacity, and impacts of payments, clearing and settlement services provided for internal and external parties.
- Effective processes that are capable of managing, valuing, and tracking available and encumbered collateral before and during resolution, including tools to readily identify the amount, level, type and eligibility of collateral by jurisdiction and the effects of re-hypothecation.
- The capability to measure the overall level of asset encumbrance.
- MIS capabilities to be sufficiently flexible to provide information suitable for decision-making under different resolution scenarios and quickly produce information required to reinstate funding from investors in resolution (e.g. amount, quality, type, and jurisdiction of assets).

In addition, the operational plan should demonstrate the bank's ability to execute its funding options in resolution. This could be documented in the form of a playbook covering the following areas for each option:

- Functions and processes that support execution of the option (e.g. steps for providing liquidity to each MLE, in a resolution context, along with analysis of any potential legal and operational impediments to doing so).
- Preconditions that MLEs would need to satisfy (e.g. legal, regulatory, or operational obstacles to transferring funds between entities).
- Processes for identifying assets that have the potential to be: (i) used as collateral to raise additional HQLA, (ii) used for secured funding in secondary markets, or (iii) eligible at central banks including collateral that has already been accepted at the central banks but remains unused. This should be supported by references to the operational procedures that would be used to monetize the collateral.
- Mitigating options for any legal or technical impediments to using the identified collateral in resolution. (e.g. to quickly identify and determine legal rights to all collateral pledged to, pledged by, or held in custody by material operating entities within the group).
- Communication strategies that would support the proposed actions.

- Ex-ante measures to support execution of options for maintaining or moving liquidity in different currencies (e.g. measures to maintain access to the foreign exchange markets).

Please refer to Appendix H for the liquidity and funding self-assessment template.

## 3.5 Operational Continuity of Critical Shared Services

### 3.5.1 Introduction

Operational continuity refers to ensuring or supporting continuity of the critical shared services that are necessary to maintain the provision of, or facilitate, the orderly wind-down of the bank's critical functions in resolution. A service model that facilitates continuity, separability, and restructuring is critical for resolving the bank. It cannot be assumed that the structure and business operations of the bank will remain unchanged; therefore, options for divestiture contemplated under the resolution strategy should be considered in planning for operational continuity.

### 3.5.2 Requirements

The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's ability to maintain the continuity of critical services in support of the resolution strategy. The analysis should focus on the feasibility of the actions required to retain or replace these services, addressing and analyzing the risks to interruption and the rights of use and access to operational assets (facilities, information technology, intellectual property, etc.).

The risks to the interruption of services are driven by the service delivery models:

- Provision of services by a division within a regulated legal entity
- Provision of services by an intra-group service company
- Contractual services provided by a third-party provider
- Provision of services by entities or service providers located in different jurisdictions.

In addition to the actions necessary to maintain services, the bank's plan should analyze and demonstrate their capability to access information required for operational continuity in an efficient and timely manner.

An operational continuity self-assessment template (refer to Appendix I) will allow the bank to ensure that key aspects of the FSB *Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution* are captured within its resolution plan.

## 3.6 Continuity of Access to FMIs

### 3.6.1 Introduction

The operational plan should demonstrate the bank's ability to maintain continuity of access to critical services in support of the resolution strategy, including access to critical Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) and correspondent banking services needed to perform payment, settlement and clearing functions.

### 3.6.2 Contingency Plan Requirements (For each Critical FMI)

Banks must provide a credible contingency plan for each critical FMI, outlining the risks to maintaining access in resolution along with the actions to mitigate such risks. The contingency plans should focus on the bank's method(s) of FMI access that need to be continued to support the resolution strategy, regardless of whether the bank is a direct participant or reliant on an intermediary. This information is then summarized to form the FMI Section of the operational plan. The contingency plans should be consistent with the FSB's *Guidance on Continuity of Access to Financial Market Infrastructures for a Firm in Resolution*.

It is the bank's responsibility to ensure the contingency plans remain comprehensive and current, and that a process is in place to stay informed of material changes (i.e. FMI rule changes), which includes consultation with the FMIs.

#### 3.6.2.1 Mapping & foundational information

This section of the contingency plan should contain information on the relevant legal entities and intermediaries for each critical FMI, ensuring alignment with the bank's resolution profile. This includes:

- Organization chart illustrating those legal entities that directly and indirectly participate in each FMI, as well as those entities / businesses reliant on the FMI services to perform critical functions;
- Identification of critical correspondent banking relationships (e.g., for indirect access, settlement, nostro accounts) required to access each FMI;
- Services provided to the FMI (if applicable);
- Jurisdiction of FMI and any regulatory/supervisory bodies that would be involved if a direct participant (or affiliate) were in resolution;
- Identification of critical operational elements of the bank's business as usual access to each FMI (e.g. critical staffing, data / systems etc.);
- BAU communication protocols between the bank and FMI;
- Types and amount of collateral posted in business-as-usual;
- Types of credit facilities utilized (if applicable);
- Historical daily value of margin required by the FMI; and



- Details related to the provision of critical payment/ clearing/ settlement service to third parties (if applicable).

### 3.6.2.2 Risk identification

Based on the mapping and foundational information, this section of the contingency plan should identify bank-specific risks to maintaining access in resolution. As part of the risk identification process, the analysis must reflect the bank's planned method of access in resolution (e.g. direct vs. indirect) and its unique legal and operating structure. This work includes and is informed by:

- Engagement with the FMI (or third-party service provider) to obtain a thorough understanding of the rules and contractual requirements that govern the bank's relationship with the FMI and intermediaries, including those applicable to the bank's entry into resolution and strategy for the direct participant and parent bank (if different entities);
- Identification of actions and / or heightened requirements that may be imposed during resolution and analysis of risks to termination due to not meeting the requirements, including:
  - Estimation of most likely and worst case incremental financial resources;
  - Reporting and communication requirements; and
  - Loss of existing credit facility;
- Analysis of potential risks to termination beyond the FMI's rules, includes:
  - Maintaining critical operational requirements (e.g. staffing, data / systems etc.); and
  - Loss of critical correspondent banking relationships;
- Inventory of actions which the FMI service provider may take to terminate or suspend access should those requirements above not be met, including:
  - The timeframe in which these actions may be taken;
  - The likelihood that these actions are undertaken; and
  - Consequences to the bank.

### 3.6.2.3 Actions for maintaining access

In this section of the contingency plan, the bank should explain how it intends to maintain access to critical FMI services and provide an overall conclusion of the bank's ability to maintain access. This section should clearly outline the actions for mitigating the identified risks and meeting the incremental financial and / or operational requirements imposed on the bank over the resolution timeline, from the runway through to the initial stabilization period. Mitigating actions should be clearly linked to the risks identified in Section 3.6.2.2. Where the bank has identified ex-ante actions to mitigate risks, they should be clearly described in the bank's work plan.

#### 3.6.2.4 Obstacles and unmitigated risks

This section of the contingency plan highlights the residual unmitigated risks to continuity that cannot be controlled and/or resolved as part of ex-ante resolution planning. This work should align with the inventory of risks in Section 3.6.2.2, addressing only the unmitigated portion, including where FMI rules could lead to automatic suspension / termination. The bank should identify possible actions by regulatory authorities to address risks that cannot be mitigated.

This section should also include an impact assessment outlining the consequences of termination or reduced access on the bank's ability to execute its resolution plan or continue critical functions / critical shared services. As part of this analysis, the bank should consider potential disruption to the financial system, the risk of contagion, and foreign jurisdictional risk.

#### 3.6.3 Operational Plan Requirements (Summary of Contingency Plans)

The operational plan should summarize the operational-level details of the contingency plans. This includes:

- A summary of the bank's mapping and foundational information including the following for each FMI:
  - List of critical FMIs;
  - Direct and indirect participating legal entities;
  - Critical correspondent banking relationships; and
  - Critical functions and critical shared services supported.
- A summary of the actions for maintaining access to each FMI.
  - A table showing worst case and most likely additional financial requirements for each FMI for the initial stabilization phase of resolution, and aggregate totals for all FMIs. The bank's ability to meet the financial requirements should be demonstrated in the Scenario analysis.
  - An assessment of the bank's ability to meet and maintain incremental non-financial requirements.
- An overall conclusion on the bank's ability to maintain access to critical FMIs in resolution based on the analysis within the contingency plans.
- The Bank should ensure that its existing capabilities can be leveraged to meet heightened operational requirements due to FMI actions in resolution (e.g., the identification and timely placement of collateral, increased reporting, communication and human resource requirements).

## 3.7 Trading Book Wind-Down Plan

### 3.7.1 Introduction

In resolution the wind-down of a bank's trading books is one of the single most impactful restructuring measures that can be undertaken, as well as a necessary means to de-risk the balance sheet and meet expected liquidity demands. It is therefore critical that the bank demonstrates that it is able to wind-down its trading book and is able to do so in a manner which (i) promotes Canadian financial stability, (ii) helps meet their liquidity needs, and (iii) minimizes losses.

This guidance serves to assist the bank in planning for a trading book wind-down, ensuring wind-down strategies are credible and that the financial impacts and legal and operational feasibility of such actions have been adequately considered and analyzed. This will allow for the risks associated with the wind-down to be identified, quantified and mitigated, as well as inform any public-sector responses that could be taken to promote an orderly resolution and wind-down.

### 3.7.2 Trading Book Profile

The intent of the trading book profile is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the size, composition, activities and location(s) of the bank's trading book as well as derivatives held as part of the banking book (e.g. structural hedges of the balance sheet of the bank).

For the purpose of this exercise, positions considered in scope for the trading book is wider than the accounting definition of trading book and includes all trading activities, securities held by the bank (including AFS portfolios held by Treasury units within the bank) and all eligible financial contracts<sup>46</sup> (EFCs, both exchange traded and over-the-counter, including those used for structural hedges of the balance sheet), regardless of where within the bank they are booked<sup>47</sup>.

In order to determine the approaches to wind-down the different parts of the trading book, the bank should provide a segmentation of their trading book across key dimensions that are most relevant in resolution. This segmentation should serve as the basis for determining the strategic actions for each part of the trading book, as well as identifying trading book assets that either cannot be sold or would be difficult to sell or exit.

#### 3.7.2.1 Requirements

A segmentation template should be completed by the bank. Guidance on completing the template is provided in Appendix J.

The aim of the template is to provide a consistent description of the contents of each segment by requiring specific characteristics to be identified. All position characteristics that materially affect the wind-down approach should be reflected in the segmentation.

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<sup>46</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

<sup>47</sup> While the scope of the Trading book profile is intended to provide a complete overview of all of the bank's trading assets and EFCs, the focus of the analyses and discussions described in Section 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 of this guidance is expected to be on the less liquid parts of the trading book.

The bank should segment their trading book by:

- Business area and sub-business area
- Product type,
- OTC,
- Governing jurisdiction,
- Booking entity,
- Structural balance sheet hedge,
- Fair value hierarchy level/liquidity level.

The level of granularity in the segmentation should reflect the liquidity and complexity of positions. For less liquid and more complex positions, the bank should apply judgement to add any relevant segmentation dimensions, in addition to the list of dimensions above, in instances where the above dimensions would not be enough to differentiate between positions that would be subject to different sets of actions or assumptions in resolution. Conversely, the bank should also apply judgement in segmenting of parts of the trading book that would likely be subject to similar sets of actions and assumptions, where lower granularity may be needed (e.g. in terms of product type). There might for example be no need for the bank to split Level 1 High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLAs) into a long list of product types, if the bank anticipates it can quickly liquidate all assets within this category even under stress.

For each segment in the template, the bank should provide a concise description of the activities associated with the segment. In particular, where the assets in the segment are identified as assets that either cannot be sold, or would be difficult to sell, exit or move, the bank should provide a description of the characteristics (e.g. illiquidity) that prevent such actions.

In addition to completing the template, the bank should provide a summary discussion of the information included in the template. The discussion should cover a description of the key activities of their trading book and the approach used to determine the segmentation. The bank should also discuss parts of their trading book that are identified as less liquid, that are used as structural balance sheet hedges (i.e. positions that are linked to items attached to the balance sheet and as a result cannot be wound down without exposing the bank to material market risk and losses) or are otherwise difficult or potentially unbeneficial to wind-down.

### 3.7.3 Strategic Actions and Associated Impact on Liquidity, Capital and Financial Markets

The intent of this component is to provide an overview of the actions that would be taken to wind-down the trading book and the impact those actions would have on liquidity, capital and the stability of financial markets.

### 3.7.3.1 Requirements

#### Assignment and key characteristics of wind-down strategies

The bank should assign a wind-down strategy for each segment of the trading book<sup>48</sup> and describe the key characteristics of the proposed wind-down strategies, including:

- Timing of actions taken,
- Dependencies,
- Assumptions and triggers required to carry out the strategy, and
- Potential counterparty behavior and market factors that impact the choice of strategy.

The bank should discuss how the preferred wind-down strategies are consistent with the respective characteristics of the segments, and how the pace of the wind-down balances the need to generate liquidity while minimizing losses and supporting the overarching objective of maintaining stability of the broader Canadian financial system. For example, the bank may wind-down some segments primarily to meet its liquidity needs. Other segments the bank may be forced to wind-down because its counterparties are assumed to exercise early termination rights or because trades mature, and the bank assumes it cannot find a counterparty who are willing to renew the trades. In some cases, the bank may further assume it will not be able to wind-down certain segments because of their illiquidity. In segments where the bank has a substantial market share as a market maker, the bank will also need to discuss how these aspects impact the choice of wind-down strategy and demonstrate that the contemplated actions and pace are minimizing disruption to the financial system.

***The discussion should focus on the more illiquid and complex segments of the trading book and clearly identify where the bank expects it would face the most challenges in a wind-down.*** The bank should also identify measures that could be taken, both ex-ante and in resolution, to ensure the wind-down can be carried out in an orderly way. To the extent that segments of the trading portfolio will remain as a residual portfolio at the end of the wind-down period, the bank should describe the risk associated with this residual portfolio and how this can be managed.

In addition to the above discussion, the bank should complete the fields in the template as instructed in Appendix J by specifying the assigned wind-down strategies and time to wind-down for each segment.

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<sup>48</sup> Examples of potential wind-down strategies are provided in Appendix K.

### Analysis of impact on liquidity, capital and financial markets

To substantiate the impact on liquidity and capital, the bank should estimate the financial resources required to support the wind-down strategies. The analysis should include estimated losses<sup>49</sup> and liquidity needs over time, until the completion of the wind-down.

Losses and net liquidity impact should be quantified for each trading book segment, at each point in time outlined, as described in Appendix J.

The results of the analysis on the impact on liquidity and losses should inform the resolution scenario analysis of the bank's liquidity and funding position and recapitalization needs in resolution.

#### 3.7.3.2 Assumptions

The bank should include a discussion and justification of the assumptions made as part of the analysis on the impact on liquidity, capital and financial markets, including assumptions on:

- Haircuts and the assumed trade-off between time to unwind and price realized,
- Drivers of losses,
- Margin requirements (e.g. additional requirement to pledge collateral due to credit rating downgrades),
- Market capacity to absorb the level and pace of the wind-down,
- Counterparty actions (e.g. potential early termination of contracts), and
- Actions by authorities in foreign jurisdictions that could affect the trading book wind-down.

The bank should also discuss their ability to replace or find alternative hedging strategies in lieu of terminated or maturing bilateral (OTC) derivative contracts used for structural balance sheet hedges and the costs and risks associated with such alternatives.

To substantiate the impact of key assumptions made, the bank should identify the assumptions having the most material impact on their aggregate estimates of losses and liquidity impact (e.g. time to wind-down, or haircuts), and perform a sensitivity analysis of aggregate estimates to changes in those assumptions from the base case. For each key assumption, the bank should define an upper and lower bound of the range, within which the assumption parameter could reasonably be expected under the assumed stress. The bank should then quantify the impact of replacing its assumed value with these end points on their aggregate loss and liquidity estimates. Assumptions made by the bank should be consistent with the considerations described below:

#### Objectives and length of wind-down period

The wind-down of the trading book should support the bank's overall resolution strategy. In line with the outcomes that CDIC seeks to achieve through the resolution planning process, the wind-down of

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<sup>49</sup> Throughout this document, losses refer to losses incurred due to actions associated with the resolution (e.g. counterparty actions) and actions taken by the bank as part of their strategy for the trading book (e.g. liquidation of positions); not the expected losses due to market movements or counterparty defaults that are not the result of the trading-book wind-down.

the trading book should allow the bank to minimize its reliance on public sector financial assistance, while being carried out in an orderly way to minimize losses for the bank and avoid disruption to the operations of the Canadian financial system. Therefore, the timeframe of the wind-down should be determined by balancing these opposing considerations: (i) minimize the required liquidity, (ii) minimize losses, and (iii) minimize disruption to the operations of the financial system. Different timeframes for the wind-down may be optimal for different banks, depending on the size and composition of the trading book, nature of the trading activities, the bank's need for liquidity and the availability of TLAC to cover losses. For the purpose of this exercise, CDIC expects that balancing the considerations above would likely result in a wind-down period no shorter than 12 months and no longer than 24 months, consistent with outputs from similar exercises in foreign jurisdictions. The bank should justify its suggested timeframe by discussing how it balances the above considerations.

It is expected that at the end of the wind-down period there may still be a smaller portion of the trading book remaining if the bank has identified that these positions either cannot be wound down or that doing so would not be in support of the bank's resolution strategy. As such, positions which are required to minimize the overall risk exposure of the bank (e.g. hedges of the structural balance sheet) are not expected to be wound down by the bank. However, the bank should assess the risk that such positions could be terminated by the bank's counterparties and outline how the bank can respond to such actions.

### Assumed market conditions and counterparty actions

For the purpose of this exercise, the bank can assume that other D-SIBs are not in resolution or winding down their trading books. The market conditions assumed during the wind-down should however reflect a severe liquidity stress in the financial market, with a widening of spreads and reduced market depth. The bank needs to assess and justify its assumptions on the behaviour of market participants under such stressed conditions. It should be assumed that all counterparties would act in accordance with these circumstances in their own self-interest, taking actions to protect themselves and/or manage their exposures and risk. As such, the bank cannot assume that it would be able to enter into bilateral derivatives<sup>50</sup> contracts or otherwise access OTC markets in resolution. Where bilateral derivatives contracts for hedging purposes are assumed to be replaced with exchange-traded derivatives, the bank will need to consider, and account for, potential basis risk as a result of the replacement. The bank should also discuss other actions that could be taken to mitigate the impact of not being able to replace bilateral derivative contracts (e.g. hedges for structural balance sheet), including any public-sector responses that could facilitate an orderly wind-down.

### Enforceability of stay provisions

The bank can assume that, following reaching the point of non-viability, an order has been issued for CDIC to take control, according to the bank's preferred resolution strategy, that would stay the rights for an early termination of EFCs, in accordance with the CDIC Act. All existing contractual arrangements should however be assumed to behave in accordance with contractual terms and

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<sup>50</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.

conditions of their governing jurisdiction, including any termination rights after considering the CDIC Act stay provisions.

The bank will need to analyze and make assumptions on the costs and challenges associated with finding alternatives for contracts being terminated, taking into consideration the expected exposure and applicable counterparty netting agreements. This should incorporate a quantification of contracts with terms that would enable counterparties to terminate due to the resolution event and that would be at risk of not being covered by stay provisions in resolution<sup>51</sup>. In making assumptions to quantify contracts assumed to be terminated, the bank should further consider whether a counterparty would be likely to financially benefit from terminating a contract as well as the level of sophistication of the counterparty. In cases where counterparties with a legal and contractual possibility for early termination are assumed to not do so, the bank should justify the rationale for this assumption.

### Estimation of losses

Valuation of less liquid instruments is inherently judgmental, and the bank will need to use judgement in estimating haircuts and losses on assets disposed. When making assumptions on haircuts, the bank should consider both the liquidity of instruments under stressed market conditions (linking to the indicated fair value hierarchy level / liquidity) and the impact on the price of the volume and rate of disposals (i.e. considering the impact of the unwind on market supply and demand). To the extent possible, the assumptions should be supported by an analysis of market depth (e.g. comparing the unwind to average daily trading volumes where applicable) under stressed conditions. The bank does however not need to estimate or make assumptions on second order knock on effects of systemic nature brought on by the wind-down

#### 3.7.4 Legal ability and operational capabilities to execute strategic actions

The intent of this component is to demonstrate that the bank would be able to implement the proposed strategic actions to wind-down the trading book. The bank should consider and assess potential legal or regulatory constraints that may limit its ability to wind-down the trading book in a timely and orderly manner, as well as its operational capabilities to execute the wind-down and mitigate potential operational issues.

Regulatory constraints include restrictions on the bank's ability to wind-down, transfer or renew intra-group trades due to actions taken by authorities, such as ring-fencing actions or imposing other business restrictions.

Operational capabilities include the bank's ability to produce necessary information in a timely manner to determine how and when positions can be exited.

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<sup>51</sup> Refer to section 3.7.4.1 for further detail on the analysis on the eligible financial contracts (EFCs).



### 3.7.4.1 Requirements

#### Legal ability

Legal constraints that could limit the bank's ability to wind-down the trading book in an orderly manner include limitations of the legal ability to enforce a stay of the rights for an early termination of EFCs<sup>52</sup>.

The bank should estimate, at an aggregate level, the portion of EFCs with external counterparties that are subject to foreign law, and EFCs entered into by subsidiaries whose early termination rights could not be stayed under the CDIC Act. Where EFCs would not be subject to the CDIC Act stay provisions, the bank should quantify the portion of EFCs which could be remediated by adopting an ISDA protocol, or other bilateral renegotiations of the contracts as well quantify the remaining contracts that would be at risk in resolution.

Banks should also assess the sensitivity of the contracts to a rating downgrade or withdrawal of credit rating.

For types of contracts identified as at risk of early termination in resolution, as well as contracts identified to have requirements for additional collateral in the case of a downgrade or loss of credit rating, the bank should estimate and account for the impact on liquidity and capital as part of the analysis described under section 3.7.3.1 above, and also outline a plan for mitigating actions that can be taken.

#### Regulatory constraints

The bank should discuss how potential regulatory interventions could impact the wind-down, in particular in relation to cross-border inter-affiliate trades in the case when trading positions are managed as a single book across different jurisdictions. The bank should discuss the impact of actions by the subsidiary boards or the host authorities to restrict the wind-down, transfer or roll-over of such trades, and how such actions would impact the wind-down strategy. The bank should also discuss how restrictions on the flow of assets across entities in different jurisdictions (e.g. due to ring-fencing), could impact the proposed strategic actions for winding down the trading book.

#### Operational capabilities

The bank should demonstrate that it has the adequate capabilities (i.e., staff, systems, information and access to financial market infrastructure) to execute the wind-down strategies. The bank should also consider its ability to track and monitor its risk positions during the wind-down and the ability to minimize and mitigate open risk arising as a result of the wind-down (e.g. due to asymmetric wind-down of positions).

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<sup>52</sup> Early termination of EFCs could result in a disorderly unwinding of positions and a significant loss of value due to the complex and time-consuming process required for valuation and netting of positions, as well as the counterparty claims for costs associated with the close-out netting process, and destabilizing effects on market asset pricing due to accelerated collateral liquidation.

The bank should demonstrate that the obligations under financial contracts can continue to be performed upon entry into resolution. This should include safe settlement, payment and delivery obligations and provision of collateral.

The bank should demonstrate the ability to produce the information needed for the wind-down in a timely manner in resolution. This includes:

- Ability to rapidly aggregate detailed trading book positions and exposure data and classify positions by maturity and liquidity to determine how and when positions can be exited,
- System capabilities to produce the necessary information on all of its financial contracts, including identifying trigger events and contracts at risk of early termination in resolution,
- Capabilities to timely track sources and uses of collateral, including ability to produce information on collateral posted/received for each of the bank's legal entities and for each material counterparty group,
- Ability to rapidly produce information on netting arrangements, and
- Ability to produce contact details for counterparties, FMIs and authorities that would need to be contacted to support an orderly wind-down.

The bank should self-assess its operational capabilities and the time needed to produce the above information needed in resolution. This assessment should be summarized in a view of current capabilities, likely challenges with regards to people, processes and system/technology in resolution, and a path forward for areas where capabilities need to be enhanced. Where enhancements are needed, these should be incorporated into the work plan.

## 3.8 Key Regulators & Actions to Satisfy Regulatory Requirements

### 3.8.1 Introduction

Individual jurisdictions may impose their own requirements for the application of specific resolution powers (e.g. local recognition of foreign proceedings) and national authorities will have varying prudential norms (e.g. the establishment of new financial entities, new licensing requirements, or approvals of the transfer of assets and liabilities of existing entities). As part of this work, the bank should consider applicable insolvency or resolution regimes, as well as any governance-related considerations, where the outcome is to understand the triggers that can lead to subsidiaries or branches becoming separated (i.e. leading to loss of control) during resolution. The ability to continue to meet existing regulatory requirements as well as to obtain the necessary approvals for executing the resolution strategy in a timely manner, will require proactive planning and preparation, across jurisdictions.

### 3.8.2 Requirements

The operational plan should demonstrate how these regulatory requirements could be managed in a manner that supports the resolution strategy. The plan should contain the following information for each authority identified in Module 1 – Resolution Profile & Strategy:

- A basic description of the actions necessary to maintain regulatory compliance and/or obtain licensing or other regulatory approvals needed for each MLE.
- Contact information at the authority.
- Contact information (departments, functional areas) at the bank who would be responsible for engaging with the identified authorities.

The separation of a subsidiary can occur because of the duties of its board of directors, regulator or creditor actions (e.g. petition for insolvency proceeding by debt holders), or actions by major stakeholders (e.g. significant counterparties or suppliers). The bank should identify these major stakeholders and consider situations where obligations towards them may conflict with obligations towards the parent bank, triggering a unilateral separation.

Banks that are subject to multiple regulatory regimes and have been, or will be, required to develop resolution plans for one or more foreign authorities should also include an assessment of the alignment of their resolution strategy and actions with these plans. The operational plan should contain an analysis of the following:

- The impact of the execution of the foreign resolution plan on the ability to execute the domestic resolution strategy.
- The operational impediments, ex-ante actions identified in the foreign plans, their relevance to the execution of the resolution strategy and what the remediating actions that are being proposed or under way with timelines for completion.

## Module 4 – Resolution Plan Testing

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### 4.1 Introduction

CDIC views testing as an integral facet of building credible resolution plans and expects that each bank validates the effectiveness of its crisis capabilities through testing exercises. These internal testing exercises should leverage the significant progress the bank has made in recovery plan testing, developing playbooks and integrating crisis management into its BAU policies and processes. The testing of resolution plans and the development of the capabilities required for implementation, is an evolving area of work for both CDIC and the banks, and therefore incremental focus is needed in testing the specific elements related to resolution.

A testing program is a foundational element in validating the effectiveness of the bank's capabilities to implement its resolution strategy. The following are key objectives of resolution testing programs:

- **Enhance confidence in the strategy and resolution regime.** Testing should provide a degree of confidence that each bank's resolution strategy can be implemented within the Canadian framework.
- **Build awareness.** Testing exercises should increase awareness of the challenges associated with executing the strategy and build a crisis mindset within the bank.
- **Confirm roles in a crisis.** Testing should help confirm that the roles and responsibilities of the bank's financial crisis response team, are clear and understood within the organization.
- **Validate capabilities and the level of preparedness to implement resolution plans.** To confirm that the necessary capabilities exist, function as expected, and produce the results needed to implement the plan.
- **Facilitate continuous improvement.** Testing exercises should be based on the assumption that improvements can be made; the objective should be to identify meaningful remediation actions. Testing programs should include a feedback process whereby identified issues are tracked and addressed as part of the work plan.

### 4.2 Requirements – D-SIB Testing Programs

As outlined within CDIC's resolution By-law, the D-SIB must establish policies and procedures that ensure its resolution plan is maintained and tested. It is also expected that D-SIB resolution plan testing programs should be eventually subject to review by the bank's Internal Audit function. As such, the policies, processes and procedures related to the Testing Program should be incorporated into the internal audit universe and regularly reviewed by Internal Audit with the same rigor as is applied to other auditable areas of the bank.

The bank should leverage existing content from its recovery plan testing programs to the extent possible, to address the requirements set out below.

Prior to conducting tests, the D-SIB should submit comprehensive scoping documents detailing the test objectives, participants, role of internal audit, and other key elements of the test design for CDIC to review. Upon completion of a test, the bank should submit the results of the testing exercise to CDIC for review.

Component	Description
<b>Objective</b>	<p><b><i>Clearly defined principles to guide the testing activities.</i></b></p> <p>Examples of overall testing program objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase confidence in the bank’s ability to address a financial crisis</li> <li>• Increase crisis management awareness</li> <li>• Continuous improvement of the resolution plan, associated capabilities, and preparedness</li> <li>• Integration with the work plan</li> </ul>
<b>Governance, Roles, and Responsibilities</b>	<p><b><i>Documentation of the governance policies over the testing program.</i></b></p> <p><b><i>Assignment of ownership and oversight for each stage of the testing methodology.</i></b></p> <p>Examples of content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning</li> <li>• Execution</li> <li>• Analysis of results</li> <li>• Reporting of results</li> </ul>
<b>Testing Methodology</b>	<p><b><i>A structured methodology for testing exercises.</i></b></p> <p>Examples of content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning (resourcing, systems, coordination with 3rd parties, type of test, criteria for success)</li> <li>• Execution</li> <li>• Analysis of results (post mortem, documented)</li> <li>• Reporting (based on governance section)</li> </ul>

Component	Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Follow up actions (changes to the plan or capabilities)</li> </ul>
<b>Types of tests</b>	<p><b><i>A description of the various testing methods available.</i></b></p> <p>Examples of content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Table top, simulation, walk through, fire drill, back test, stakeholder engagement</li> <li>Pros &amp; cons of each test type</li> <li>Areas where each test type could be used</li> </ul>
<b>Prioritization</b>	<p><b><i>A framework for identifying testing priorities.</i></b></p> <p>It is important for the bank to have a prioritized testing inventory with an expected corresponding schedule. Testing efforts should initially focus on the most critical resolution capabilities, with the intention of identifying areas of additional work and updating the work plan. Specifically, the bank should prioritize testing efforts on its ability to produce information supporting: i) bail-in valuations in a compressed timeframe (e.g. T+48 hours), ii) trading book wind-down, and iii) daily and intra-day stressed cashflows by MLE, all under conditions of stress (e.g. scenario conditions).</p> <p>Examples of criteria include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unique to resolution</li> <li>Can the target be tested outside of a crisis?</li> <li>Capabilities exist vs capabilities being developed</li> <li>Importance to resolution</li> </ul>
<b>Testing Inventory</b>	<p><b><i>A list of potential aspects of resolution that could be tested.</i></b></p> <p>CDIC considers areas that would have a material impact on executing the resolution strategy and/or are critical to maintaining financial stability good candidates for testing. Examples include capabilities and processes related to the provision of temporary liquidity, valuation for the purpose of recapitalizing the bank and public communication in a crisis. These areas should be identified through the work plan template as they support the bank's progress toward resolvability.</p>

Component	Description
<b>Scheduling and Frequency</b>	Scheduling is based on the prioritization criteria and should include an estimated testing frequency where applicable (ex. annual, biannual, quarterly, etc.). When scheduling, the bank should consider if a single testing exercise may be able to address more than one resolution capability.
<b>Joint Testing</b>	Within the schedule, the aspects of resolution that could be jointly tested with CDIC should be clearly identified / included.

### 4.3 Requirements – Joint Testing

Joint testing forms part of D-SIB's resolution testing activities and should be distinguished from tests that the bank undertakes itself to verify and improve upon its resolution plan and associated capabilities.

CDIC views joint testing as any testing exercise where both CDIC and the D-SIB play a role in assessing resolution capabilities, identifying gaps and / or providing recommendations. CDIC's role during joint testing exercises with the bank may vary depending on the capability or area being tested and the testing approach selected. CDIC may play an active on-site role in the testing exercise, or on-site as an observer, or may assess the results of a test off-site after the D-SIB has conducted its test. CDIC's expectation is that joint testing exercises will increase in complexity over time.

## Module 5 – Impediments and Work Plan

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### 5.1 Impediments

#### 5.1.1 Introduction

An essential component of the bank developing a credible and feasible resolution plan is the identification of impediments (i.e. resolvability risks) to the timely implementation of the resolution strategy. It is essential to assess how these impediments are removed or mitigated through the bank's resolution planning and to assess what remains as a residual risk or uncertainty that cannot be mitigated ex-ante.

CDIC's assessment of the bank's resolution plan allows CDIC to conclude on the D-SIB's ability to implement the resolution strategy. The outcomes expected to be demonstrated by the resolution plan form CDIC's assessment criteria. Applying the assessment criteria allows CDIC to identify the risk to executing the resolution strategy (i.e. the resolvability risk) and verifies how the bank mitigates the risk based on the information, analysis, and conclusions provided by the bank in the resolution plan.

#### 5.1.2 Requirements

The bank should provide a summary of the assessment of impediments to the implementation of the resolution strategy, the impact of such impediments on CDIC's ability to implement the resolution strategy, and the impact on the continuity of critical functions.

CDIC has identified the following key resolvability risks and, through the resolution planning feedback, outlines areas requiring further work for the bank. In the assessment, the bank should outline the measures taken to remove or mitigate the resolvability risks and what remains as a residual risk or uncertainty that cannot be mitigated ex-ante.

- Legal structure suitability
- Loss absorbency
- Access to liquidity
- Bail-in execution (including valuation)
- Trading book wind-down
- Continuity of access to FMIs
- Operational continuity, crisis capabilities and governance
- Key regulators<sup>53</sup> and actions to satisfy regulatory requirements

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<sup>53</sup> For definition, please refer to Appendix B.



## 5.2 Work Plan

### 5.2.1 Introduction

The bank's work plan forms a critical component of the resolution plan as it allows CDIC to track and monitor the bank's progress towards resolvability and compliance with the By-law. Given its importance, the work plan will be used to guide bi-lateral discussions between the bank and CDIC throughout the resolution planning cycle.

### 5.2.2 Requirements

In the resolution plan, the bank should outline the governance process to ensure oversight of both the development and the review of the work plan, prior to its submission to CDIC.

Where applicable, the work plan must link the work plan actions to the bank's testing program, identify the areas to be tested, and outline the testing approach.

The bank's work plan should outline a complete set of actions:

- For the maintenance, validation and testing of the resolution plan;
- To incorporate the material change into the resolution plan, if the bank experienced a material change and provided a material change report prior to the submission of the current resolution plan;
- To remediate a deficiency, if it was identified in the prior submission of the resolution plan; and
- To mitigate or remove impediments, to the extent there are remaining impediments identified by the bank.

The format of the work plan should allow CDIC to track the bank's progress in completing the work plan actions between the submissions of the resolution plans. The work plan actions should be mapped to the sections of the resolution plan; for each action the work plan should indicate a start and end date, ownership, and progress update (stage, status, principal activities completed during the last 12 months), issues identified, and link to the testing plan, where appropriate. Please refer to Appendix L for the work plan template.

The work plan is required to be submitted as part of the resolution plan submission<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>54</sup> CDIC Resolution Planning By-law, s.7(k)


## Appendix A: Point of Entry

The FSB refers to two different approaches for entry into resolution; SPE and MPE. The alignment towards one approach over another is often unclear and involves the assessment of many factors such as the geographic location of the bank's critical functions, the location of TLAC amongst legal entities and characteristics of the bank's structural models.

### SPE and MPE approaches<sup>55</sup>

**SPE** Involves the application of resolution powers (e.g. bail-in and/or transfer tools) at the top parent or holding company level by a single resolution authority – probably in the jurisdiction responsible for the global consolidated supervision of a group. An SPE strategy operates through the absorption of losses incurred within the group by the top parent or holding company (e.g. through the write-down and/or mandatory conversion of unsecured debt issued by that top company into equity (“bail-in”). Provided that sufficient TLAC is available at the top parent company, operating subsidiaries should be able to continue as a going concern without entering resolution. However, host authorities may need to exercise powers to support the resolution led by the home authorities.


**Figure VI: Illustration of a simplified SPE approach**



<sup>55</sup> FSB, [Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies](#), July 16, 2013.

**MPE** Involves the application of resolution powers by two or more resolution authorities to different parts of the group and is likely to result in a break-up of the group into two or more separate parts. The group could be split on a national or regional basis, along business lines, or some combinations of each. The resolution powers applied to the separate parts need not be the same and could include resolution options, such as bail-in within resolution, use of a bridge entity, transfer of business or wind-down. MPE strategies nevertheless require actions to be coordinated across jurisdictions to avoid conflicts or inconsistencies that undermine the effectiveness of the separate resolution actions, a disorderly run on assets and contagion across the bank.

**Figure VII: Illustration of a simplified MPE approach**



## Appendix B: Definitions

Term	Definition and Reference
<b>Balance sheet valuation</b>	A balance sheet valuation involves conducting a separate valuation of each asset and liability in accordance with IFRS and regulatory capital requirements. The valuation would need to assess the capital required to restore the D-SIB to viability, and as such should provide a prudent and fair assessment of the financial position of the bank to ensure that losses (incurred and expected losses) as well as the restructuring plans and other associated resolution costs are fully recognized at the time of resolution.
<b>Bilateral derivatives</b>	Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives that are not exchange traded or cleared through a central counterparty.
<b>Credible/feasible</b>	Credible means that the strategy or an action <i>would be executed</i> considering potential internal and external impact. Feasible means that the strategy or an action <i>could be executed</i> based on the existence of legal, operational and financial capacity and capabilities (people, processes and technology) to do so.
<b>Critical function</b>	<p>An activity performed by an entity within the bank group for persons not affiliated with the bank group and whose absence or failure would have an adverse effect on the stability of the financial system or on the functioning of the economy in Canada.</p> <p>The following elements should be considered when assessing criticality of a function:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Size and role in the market</li> <li>• Barriers to substitutability (availability and ease)</li> <li>• Impact – importance of service continuity to customer’s financial health and the functioning of the Canadian economy</li> <li>• Contagion risk and interconnectedness to other financial institutions and markets</li> </ul> <p>For further context refer to: FSB Guidance on <a href="#">Identification of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Services</a>, published July 16, 2013 <a href="#">and FSB Guidance on Cooperation and Information Sharing with Host Authorities</a>, published November 3, 2015.</p>
<b>Critical shared service</b>	<p>An activity that is performed by an entity within the bank group or an external provider for one or more business units or legal entities of the bank group and whose absence or failure would lead to the cessation of, or present a material risk to the continuity of, critical functions.</p> <p>In identifying its critical shared services, the bank should consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Entities that provide global treasury operations, funding, or liquidity activities (inclusive of intercompany transactions) material to the exercise of the bank’s critical functions</li> </ul>

Term	Definition and Reference
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Entities that provide material operational support in resolution (key personnel, information technology, data centers, real estate or other shared services) material to the exercise of the bank's critical functions</li> <li>• Entities that are engaged in derivatives booking activities that are material to the exercise of the bank's critical functions, including those that conduct either the internal hedge side or the client-facing side of a transaction</li> <li>• Entities that hold membership in FMIs deemed material to the exercise of the bank's critical functions</li> <li>• Entities engaged in asset custody or asset management activities that are material to the exercise of the bank's critical functions</li> <li>• Entities that enter into external service arrangements material to the exercise of the bank's critical functions</li> </ul>
	<p>Refer to: <a href="#">FSB Guidance on Identification of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Services, published July 16, 2013.</a></p>
<b>Eligible financial contract (EFC)</b>	<p>Eligible financial contract is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) a derivatives agreement, whether settled by payment or delivery, that <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) trades on a futures or options exchange or board, or other regulated market, or</li> <li>(ii) is the subject of recurrent dealings in the derivatives markets or in the over-the-counter securities or commodities markets;</li> </ul> </li> <li>(b) an agreement to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) borrow or lend securities or commodities, including an agreement to transfer securities or commodities under which the borrower may repay the loan with other securities or commodities, cash or cash equivalents,</li> <li>(ii) clear or settle securities, futures, options or derivatives transactions, or</li> <li>(iii) act as a depository for securities;</li> </ul> </li> <li>(c) a repurchase, reverse repurchase or buy-sell back agreement with respect to securities or commodities;</li> <li>(d) a margin loan in so far as it is in respect of a securities account or futures account maintained by a financial intermediary;</li> <li>(e) any combination of agreements referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);</li> <li>(f) a master agreement in so far as it is in respect of an agreement referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (e);</li> </ul>

Term	Definition and Reference
	<p>(g) a master agreement in so far as it is in respect of a master agreement referred to in paragraph (f);</p> <p>(h) a guarantee of, or an indemnity or reimbursement obligation with respect to, the liabilities under an agreement referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (g); and</p> <p>(i) an agreement relating to financial collateral, including any form of security or security interest in collateral and a title transfer credit support agreement, with respect to an agreement referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (h).</p>
	<p>Refer to: subsection 39.15(9) of the <i>CDIC Act</i> and <a href="#">CDIC Act's Governor in Council Regulations, EFC Regulations</a>.</p>
<b>Emergency lending assistance (ELA)</b>	<p>Emergency Lending Assistance is a loan or advance to eligible financial institutions and financial market infrastructures at the Bank of Canada's discretion. The provision of ELA is extraordinary and designed to provide last-resort liquidity to individual financial institutions or FMIs that are facing serious liquidity problems.</p>
	<p>Refer to: <a href="#">BoC Emergency Lending Assistance</a>.</p>
<b>Enterprise value</b>	<p>Enterprise valuation refers to a whole-bank valuation, the purpose of which is to estimate the post-conversion value of the bank's equity.</p> <p>There are several standard approaches to conducting an enterprise or equity valuation recognized by Canadian and international valuation standard setting bodies (e.g. market-based approaches such as comparable trading multiples, comparable transaction multiples, dividend discount model, income-based approaches such as discounted cash flow, asset-based approaches). The preferred approach will depend on the circumstances at the time.</p>
<b>Fair value</b>	<p>Refers to the IFRS definition of fair value, that is "<i>the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date</i>".</p>
<b>Financial market infrastructures (FMIs)</b>	<p>Financial market infrastructures are a multilateral system among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the purposes of clearing, settling or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial transactions. Also known as payment, clearing, and settlement systems.</p>
	<p>Refer to: <a href="#">Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, published in April 2012</a>.</p>
<b>Intermediaries</b>	<p>Intermediaries are a broad category of financial institutions which act in an agency capacity for other banks. Common services include clearing of foreign currencies, security settlement for certain FMIs, tri-party repo clearing, and provision of access to FMIs. Also referred to as correspondent banks.</p>
<b>Key regulator</b>	<p>A domestic or foreign supervisory regulatory authority of a material legal entity.</p>

Term	Definition and Reference
<b>Liquidation value</b>	<p>As defined in the Compensation Regulations, published within the suite of bail-in regulations (<a href="https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2018-59/FullText.html">https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2018-59/FullText.html</a>):</p> <p><i>The liquidation value of a share or liability is the estimated value that the prescribed person would have received in respect of the share or liability if an order under the <a href="#">Winding-up and Restructuring Act</a> to wind up the federal member institution had been made immediately before the making of an order under subsection 39.13(1) of the Act in respect of the institution.</i></p> <p><i>Assumptions: The liquidation value is to be estimated</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>as if no order under subsection 39.13(1) of the Act has been made in respect of the federal member institution; and</i></li> <li><i>without taking into consideration any assistance, financial or other, that is or may be provided to the federal member institution, directly or indirectly, by the Corporation, by the Bank of Canada or by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province after any order to wind up the institution has been made.</i></li> </ul>
<b>Material legal entity</b>	<p>A legal entity or branch within the bank group that meets at least one of the following criteria:</p> <p>(a) it performs a critical function or a critical shared service;</p> <p>(b) the failure or disruption of its operations might prevent the implementation of the bank's resolution strategy; or</p> <p>(c) it is a member institution.</p> <p>Legal entity or branch is considered material when it meets at least one of the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Performs a critical function and/or critical shared service</li> <li>Has more than 5 percent of the group risk weighted assets</li> <li>Generate more than 5 percent of the total operating income of the consolidated group</li> <li>Has total leverage exposure measure larger than 5 percent of the consolidated leverage exposure measure for the group</li> </ul> <p>There may be other factors that may influence materiality of a legal entity, which may be identified by the bank or the authorities irrespective of whether the above criteria are met.</p>
<b>Resolution entity</b>	<p>Resolution entity is an entity to which resolution tools are applied in accordance with the resolution strategy. Depending on the resolution strategy, a resolution entity may be a parent company, an intermediate or ultimate holding company, or an operating subsidiary. The bank may have one or more resolution entities.</p> <p>Adapted from: <a href="#">FSB Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Principles and Term Sheet, published November 9, 2015.</a></p>

Term	Definition and Reference
<b>Resolution group</b>	<p>A resolution entity and any entities that are owned or controlled by a resolution entity either directly (“direct subsidiaries”) or indirectly through subsidiaries of the resolution entity (“indirect subsidiaries”) and that are not themselves resolution entities or subsidiaries of another resolution entity. Each resolution entity and each direct or indirect subsidiary of a resolution entity is part of exactly one resolution group.</p>
	<p>Adapted from: <a href="#">FSB Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Principles and Term Sheet, published November 9, 2015.</a></p>
<b>Total loss absorbency capacity (TLAC)</b>	<p>Total loss absorbing capacity refers to the feature of the Canadian bail-in regime whereby D-SIBs are required to have sufficient loss absorbing capacity to support recapitalization actions. TLAC aims to ensure the bank can withstand severe losses and emerge from resolution well-capitalized. D-SIBs are required to meet OSFI’s target risk-based TLAC ratio of at least 21.5% of risk-weighted assets plus a domestic stability buffer<sup>56</sup> and a minimum TLAC leverage ratio of at least 6.75%.</p>
	<p>Refer to: <a href="#">OSFI’s Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Guideline &amp; FSB Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Principles and Term Sheet, published November 9, 2015</a></p>
<b>Wind-down period</b>	<p>The time period from the point of non-viability until all strategic actions to wind-down the trading book have been performed.</p>

<sup>56</sup> At the time of publication, the domestic stability buffer was set at 2.0%.



## Appendix C: Self-Assessment Template – Governance

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant programs/policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
<p>1. The bank can activate its financial crisis response teams and governance protocol for resolution in coordination with CDIC.</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Crisis Protocol:</b> Does the bank have a clear governance structure for use in crisis? Does the protocol outline who and how key decisions will be made amongst Board, Senior Executive and Business Line Managers?</li> <li>• <b>Coordination with CDIC:</b> Assume CDIC’s resolution governance structure is as follows:</li> </ul> <pre> graph TD     IA[Industry Advisors] --&gt; CRO[CDIC Resolution Office]     ESA[External Standby Agents] --&gt; CRO     CRO --- CB[CDIC Board]     CRO --- TDSIBBC[Transitional D-SIB Board &amp; Committees]     TDSIBBC --- TDSIBCEO[Transitional D-SIB CEO/Executive]     TDSIBCEO --- DSIBR[D-SIB in Resolution]     </pre>	

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant programs/policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
2. CDIC can install a new (or transitional) Board of Directors and Executive while upholding corporate government requirements to the extent possible.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Governance requirements:</b> Does the bank maintain a complete list of compliance requirements (domestic and international) for existing and newly recruited Board members and could CDIC leverage those processes quickly in the event that the Board and Executive Officers were replaced?</li> <li>• <b>Charters:</b> Do existing Charters, by-laws, policies outline the responsibilities of the bank's Board its Officers, its Committees and Executive members, and could those responsibilities conflict with resolution objectives?</li> <li>• <b>Resolution risks:</b> Beyond the loss of key decision makers, has the bank identified the risks in resolution that could potentially compromise the robustness of existing governance practices?</li> </ul>	

## Appendix D: Self-Assessment Template – Resourcing

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant programs/policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
1. CDIC can rely on existing processes in place to identify key employees across the corporation and at potentially short notice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E.g. financial crisis management programs, BaU policies, BCP, M&amp;A procedures/strategies, etc. Please be specific.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Activation:</b> Are programs well documented and centralized at the top of house, such that they would be easy to activate in resolution?</li> <li><b>Testing:</b> When was the program last tested or reviewed by Internal Audit? What risks/stresses were being tested? Did the bank modify existing process to reflect the findings?</li> <li><b>Information:</b> How frequently is the underlying information updated (e.g. key man list)? How quickly can the bank produce real-time information (i.e. how long would it take to develop list of key personnel today, is it manual/automated, does it include branches, does it identify location of personnel, include contact information)?</li> <li><b>Back-up alternatives:</b> Has the bank identified alternates for its key personnel? If not, how long would it take to do so?</li> </ul>	
2. There is a process in place to contact key employees (and respond to employee concerns in crisis).			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Responsible:</b> Who (department/teams) is responsible for contacting key employees?</li> <li><b>Channels:</b> How many channels are available, and what are they? Are any channels outsourced or rely on 3<sup>rd</sup> party data providers?</li> <li><b>Testing:</b> Have all channels been tested? Were any pressure points identified in testing that could have an impact on resolution?</li> <li><b>Messaging:</b> Who determines what message is communicated. Does the bank have messages developed? Is there a protocol to deal with</li> </ul>	

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant programs/policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
			employee concerns/Qs&As in a timely fashion so as to prevent panic/confusion?	
3. Key staff can be retained (to the extent possible).			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Retention Programs:</b> What incentive programs exist? Are they enterprise-wide, or do they vary across the group?</li> <li>• <b>Financial and Non-Financial Incentives:</b> To what extent are the incentive programs tied to equity-based compensation or post-employment benefits (both of which could disappear in resolution)? What non-financial programs exist?</li> <li>• <b>Activation:</b> How quickly could those programs be invoked (consider process and length of time it would take to offer key employees with appropriate packages)?</li> <li>• <b>Testing;</b> If/when were the relevant programs last tested? What risks/stresses were being tested? Consider also relevant experience with retaining key personnel in acquisitions.</li> <li>• <b>Back-up alternatives:</b> Has the bank considered alternative options/strategies in the event that retention policies do not succeed?</li> </ul>	

## Appendix E: Self-Assessment Template – Communications

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant departments, programs, policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
1. The bank has the capability to communicate effectively in a crisis generally and/or a financial crisis specifically.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How quickly can the identified capabilities be engaged?</li> <li>What is the “endurance” of these capabilities, resources, functions, etc. (e.g. Will a crisis communications team/organization be established? Is that function only envisioned as part time or for a short duration?)</li> <li>Are capabilities embedded in “business as usual” functions or resident in “crisis” functions?</li> <li>If capabilities identified are not resident in a “crisis” function (e.g., BCM), are there clear protocols/procedures to align capabilities and requirements in the event of a financial crisis? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the bank assigned key crisis- management roles and responsibilities? Are these different than BAU?</li> <li>What are the key processes that allow for the crisis communication function to be aligned with relevant resources (e.g. LOB) during a financial crisis?</li> <li>What are the associated timelines for this transition?</li> <li>Do call centre plans allow for scalability and allow flexible scope of scenarios?</li> </ul> </li> <li>Are there existing outsourcing arrangements that support crisis communications (e.g., telephony contracts)? Is there confidence that any underlying outsourcing arrangement can continue throughout a crisis?</li> </ul>	

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant departments, programs, policies (indicate if existing or planned).	Demonstrate how programs/policies achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
2. The bank has identified distinct stakeholder groups, relevant channels and message <b>content</b> for crisis communication in resolution.			<p>Can the bank's crisis communications plan be easily leveraged for resolution?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does it include a resolution stakeholder map identifying and linking target audiences with objectives, messages, channels, strategy and risks?</li> <li>Is there a means to modify existing processes should messages need to be coordinated with CDIC before release?</li> <li>Has a linkage been made between the content of stakeholder messages and underlying information requirements? (As an example, communications with derivative counterparties may require current financial information on net positions. Consider the need and time to produce the information required to support effective communication messages.)</li> </ul>	
3. The bank has the appropriate mechanisms in place to <b>review, test and evaluate</b> its crisis communications specific to a financial crisis.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have the capabilities and plans been tested? If so, what was the scope, objective and results of those tests? Is there a plan/timeline to address any gaps?</li> <li>Did tests include foreign operations and external service providers?</li> <li>Are there any future plans to test or review capabilities? What is the scope and anticipated timeline?</li> </ul>	

## Appendix F: Valuation Challenges in Resolution

Valuation Challenges in Resolution	
<b>Off-cycle and control environment</b>	<p>In any resolution, a valuation would need to be completed in a short period of time – particularly under an immediate conversion where the bail-in conversion amount is driven by a potential loss estimate. This compressed timeframe would make it very difficult to complete a comprehensive valuation in accordance with Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators standards (as would be preferred by valuation practitioners) unless the D-SIB has sufficient readiness measures in place and the authorities have significant lead time to commence valuation readiness in the period leading up to resolution. Without additional preparedness measures, significant reliance would have to be placed on the D-SIB's internal systems, <i>ex-ante</i> valuation models and internal control processes, as well as other valuation work prepared during the pre-resolution stage which may not allow for a robust valuation in a resolution environment.</p> <p>A further challenge is that many of the financial reporting processes in place at the bank are tailored to month-end or quarter-end reporting requirements. Although some financial information can be extracted from the systems at any point in time (with manual adjustments, workarounds and sufficient time), there are likely to be challenges if the resolution date does not coincide with the end of a reporting period, particularly for positions that are not marked daily and asset classes that are vulnerable to market illiquidity and/or impairment concerns (e.g., it will be difficult to quickly assess the value of positions held at amortized cost).</p>
<b>Future outlook and forecasts</b>	<p>An approved and credible business plan is likely to be a central requirement of a comprehensive valuation (to provide an operational outlook and future forecast for the D-SIB) and would eventually be required to re-establish ratings. Business plans require significant time and organizational capacity to develop, review and vet. In the absence of these plans, the valuator will face inherent limitations with respect to the operational outlook and forecasted financial performance of the D-SIB.</p>
<b>Multi-jurisdictions and ring-fencing</b>	<p>Consideration will need to be given to the valuation complexity of assets held in foreign jurisdictions that are subject to differing regulatory, economic, and political considerations, and the potential for ring-fencing. Given the requirement to prepare the valuation in advance of ring-fencing measures, there are likely to be challenges associated with the valuation treatment of assets held in foreign jurisdictions.</p>
<b>Lack of meaningful market data and market illiquidity</b>	<p>Asset valuations, particularly security positions in the trading book, are heavily reliant on the availability of market data. In distressed illiquid market conditions, we expect that market data will either become unavailable or will not be meaningful (e.g., lack of broker quotes, disruption in Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR) benchmark rates, inability to create indices, etc.), thereby increasing the reliance on subjective estimates.</p>

## Appendix G: Valuation Readiness Assessment Checklist

The Valuation Readiness Assessment checklist is expected to be submitted as a table in the format below.

### Resolution Valuation Readiness Checklist

PREPARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

REVIEWED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose	Detail	Valuation Type	Time & Resourcing	Update Frequency	Ability to Update	In/out Scope	Resolution Challenge	Assessment	Workarounds	Primary Group
1...	1.	Balance Sheet								
	2.	Balance Sheet & Enterprise								

The table below provides further guidance on the type of information to be provided within each column of the valuation readiness assessment checklist.

Field	Description
<b>Purpose</b>	Purpose of the valuation. Entries for this field are provided by CDIC (see below).
<b>Detail</b>	Detailed requirements, actions, etc. Entries for this field are provided by CDIC (see below).
<b>Valuation Type</b>	Balance Sheet or Enterprise. Entries for this field are provided by CDIC (see below).
<b>Time &amp; Resourcing</b>	Indicate the time and resources required to gather the information, level of automation, involvement of third parties.
<b>Update Frequency</b>	How frequently is the information updated?
<b>Ability to Update</b>	How frequently can the information be updated?
<b>In/ Out Scope</b>	Would this information need to be updated over the weekend (in-scope)?
<b>Resolution Challenges</b>	Is the information impacted by any of the resolution challenges, including off cycle reporting?
<b>Assessment</b>	Is the information available in resolution within a 48-hr timeframe?
<b>Workarounds</b>	If not available with the 48-hr timeframe what ex-ante or in crisis measures could expedite or compensate for the lack of information?
<b>Primary Group</b>	Group within the bank that has primary responsibility for the activity/information.



Banks are expected to use the following to complete the **Purpose**, **Detail** and **Valuation Type** columns of the checklist:

Purpose	Detail	Type of valuation
<b>1. Provide an understanding of D-SIB's existing valuation processes and methodologies</b>	1. An inventory of valuation policies and framework.	Balance sheet
	2. An inventory of all process maps and flow charts that relate to the bank's valuation procedures.	Balance sheet and Enterprise
	3. Documentation on the valuation methodologies and models (underlying the information in #16) for each of the bank's portfolios: i. By portfolio level; ii. By instrument class / loan type level; iii. Coverage of Level 1, 2, 3. Including key assumptions, limitations, and the extent of management judgment.	Balance sheet
	4. Documentation of any other valuation techniques used by the bank that are not covered by the documentation provided in #3 above.	Enterprise and balance sheet
	5. Documentation of other valuation techniques used in stress conditions or illiquid markets, including changes to assumptions, inputs, judgment.	Enterprise and balance sheet
<b>2. Provide an understanding of D-SIB's valuation infrastructure and organization</b>	6. Inventory of models used for valuation.	Enterprise and balance sheet
	7. Inventory of data inputs and their sources for all data used in valuation. (Internal)	Enterprise and balance sheet
	8. Inventory of data inputs and their sources for all data used in valuation. (External)	Enterprise and balance sheet
	9. Inventory of organization charts for all departments and teams engaged in the valuation process (e.g., Finance, IPV, Risk, Corporate Development) including contact details.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	10. Valuation Committee mandate and members.	Balance sheet
	11. Inventory of current external pricing/data vendors and their contact details.	Balance sheet
	12. Inventory of alternative data/pricing vendors.	Balance sheet
	13. Documentation of the Bank's IT infrastructure and key operating systems, including a mapping of instrument class / portfolio / legal entity to systems.	Balance sheet
	14. Inventory of critical systems required for valuation to be maintained during resolution.	Balance sheet
	15. Inventory of key controls supporting the Bank's valuation process.	Balance sheet
<b>3. Leverage the bank's existing valuation processes to generate estimates and allow for prioritization of asset/liability classes to aid efficiency</b>	16. Ability to provide a detailed breakdown of fair value hierarchy of instruments – Level 1,2,3 and supporting analysis, including a mapping / identification of each instrument class to: i. Valuation methodology and models – normal course; ii. Valuation methodology and models – stress conditions (e.g. changes in assumptions, inputs, judgment); iii. Valuation system / platform / spreadsheet; iv. Valuation risk and uncertainties; v. Interconnectedness (e.g. hedging). Information availability by: i. Consolidated / aggregated level; ii. Legal entity level.	Balance sheet
	17. Ability to provide asset valuation (fair value and amortized cost) reports on loans prepared by the bank by: i. Loan level;	Balance sheet

Purpose	Detail	Type of valuation
	ii. Portfolio level; iii. Legal entity level.	
	18. Ability to provide liability valuation (fair value and amortized cost) reports prepared by the bank by: i. Liability class (e.g., deposits, unsecured debt instruments, derivatives, subordinated debt); ii. Legal entity.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	19. Ability to perform an impairment review (amortized cost assets).	Balance sheet and enterprise
	20. Ability to provide asset valuation reports performed by the bank or third parties.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	21. Ability to provide an amount and basis to calculate adjustments/reserves in derivatives/trading/securities portfolio: i. Independent Price Verification (IPV) Adjustments; ii. Credit Valuation Adjustments (CVA); iii. Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA); iv. Close out/uncertainty; v. Any other adjustments.	Balance sheet
	22. Ability to provide derivative exposure amounts by counterparty: i. Consolidated; ii. By legal entity.	Balance sheet
4. Provide an understanding of the historical P&L and balance sheet trends	23. Ability to provide historical balance sheets and income statements for the last 3 years along with detailed schedules (including other material assets such as deferred tax assets, goodwill, intangibles).	Balance sheet and enterprise
	24. Ability to provide legal entity balance sheets and income statements for the past 3 years along with relevant schedules.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	25. Ability to provide off balance sheet exposures (e.g., leases, securitization vehicles, guarantees) by legal entity – current and for the past 3 years.	Balance sheet and enterprise
5. Provide a basis for forward-looking assumptions for valuation	26. Ability to provide projected cost of funds / interest cost movements for the liability classes (e.g. deposits, loans) 3-5 year forward.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	27. Ability to provide interest yield on interest earning assets – current and projected 3-5 year forward.	Balance sheet and enterprise
	28. Ability to provide basis to calculate the Allowance for Loan & Lease Losses (ALLL) by portfolio/asset type, and the projected ALLL by portfolio/asset type 3-5 year forward.	Balance sheet
	29. Ability to provide financial projections and monthly budgets – cash flows and income by: i. Business line; ii. Consolidated entity.  Budgeting and forecasting model for the bank.	Enterprise
	30. Ability to provide asset and liability run off schedules of the existing portfolio and estimated cash flows	Balance sheet
6. Provide a basis for an assessment of any asset quality adjustments (e.g. credit value adjustments)	31. Ability to provide a risk profile for each portfolio: i. Delinquency rates; ii. Default rates; iii. Charge-off rates; iv. Collections/recovery rate; v. Internal ratings.	Balance sheet and enterprise

Purpose	Detail	Type of valuation
7. Provide an understanding of capital position and requirements	32. Ability to calculate capital ratios and generate supporting schedules including risk weightings by asset class; and provide an inventory of internal models used for capital calculation as well as the status of their regulatory approval.	Balance sheet and enterprise
8. Provide an understanding of the impact of stress on valuation	33. Ability to provide results of stress tests: i. OSFI mandated and Enterprise-Wide Stress Testing; ii. Stress testing and sensitivity analysis by portfolio (including analysis of borrower and counterparty downgrades).	Balance sheet and enterprise

## Appendix H: Self-Assessment Template – Liquidity and Funding

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant processes / programs / functions (indicate if existing or planned.	Demonstrate how processes / programs / functions achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
1. Resolution funding needs of the D-SIB can be estimated with reasonable precision and speed in a resolution stress.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Reporting/forecasting under stressed conditions:</b> Information needs in resolution will require the ability to report by legal entity, jurisdiction, currency, at intra-day and forecast at varying time horizons. Considering these factors:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i Which of the liquidity management processes/tools that the bank has in place currently could be leveraged for estimating funding needs upon entry to resolution and during the resolution process?</li> <li>ii Which of the identified tools would provide relatively more accurate estimates in stressed conditions?</li> <li>iii Are these processes sufficient to provide the information along the aforementioned dimensions or would they need to be adapted?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Stress testing:</b> Are there any elements of the enterprise and regulatory stress testing frameworks could be leveraged for preparing or estimating funding needs in resolution?</li> <li>• <b>Preparation process:</b> Timeliness and accuracy of reporting in a crisis will be critical and will need to be managed against competing needs from the ongoing enhanced monitoring and pre-resolution requests. Considering these factors:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i How efficient are the processes of preparing the reports that could be leveraged in resolution (e.g., automated/manual, require a number of adjustments, prepared by multiple functions, using</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant processes / programs / functions (indicate if existing or planned.	Demonstrate how processes / programs / functions achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
			<p>inputs from multiple systems)? How does the process ensure integrity and reliability of data?</p> <p>ii At a minimum, what is the time required to generate the data and reports? What are the tradeoffs between the minimum vs. full reporting timeframe?</p> <p>iii Are the assumptions underpinning the reports clearly documented?</p>	
2. The D-SIB has a crisis funding strategy for resolution.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Preconditions for private funding programs:</b> Has the bank identified information or other requirements that would need to be in place in order to receive funding from investors in resolution (e.g. financials, collateral details, credit ratings, etc.)? Has the bank identified or established any processes that would facilitate reinstating its market footprint during resolution (e.g. shelf prospectus for securitization programs or debt issuances in resolution, preparations to expedite reinstating credit ratings)?</li> <li>• <b>Product and pricing strategies:</b> When developing crisis funding options, has the bank considered alternative funding products or arrangements (e.g., private consortia) and pricing strategies to attract market funding (including deposits) during and after resolution?</li> <li>• <b>Communication strategies:</b> Has the bank developed any communication plans aimed at deterring liquidity draws and bolstering market confidence in its corresponding funding strategies?</li> <li>• <b>Funding capacity:</b> Does the bank's contingency funding/liquidity plan contemplate pre-resolution actions that would reduce funding needs once in resolution (e.g., temper asset growth) or reduce funding complexity (e.g.,</li> </ul>	

TARGET OBJECTIVE	CURRENT STATE			TARGET STATE
	Identify relevant processes / programs / functions (indicate if existing or planned.	Demonstrate how processes / programs / functions achieve target objective and contribute to resolution preparedness.	Consider the following questions when assessment the current state and target state of readiness.	Propose a target state and work plan
			<p>lower reliance on foreign currency funding or cross border funding)? Please note that HQLA is not explicitly reserved for resolution, and the liquidity needs should be considered under a period longer than the 30-days horizon.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Ability to pre-position collateral:</b> Does the bank's contingency funding/liquidity plan contemplate actions that can be taken pre-resolution to provide for sufficient eligible collateral, pre-positioned to access public funding sources once in resolution?</li> </ul>	
3. The D-SIB has robust processes that are capable of supporting funding requirements in resolution.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Ability to track and monitor collateral and asset encumbrance:</b> Does the bank have the ability to track, monitor and report on collateral / asset encumbrance (e.g., usage, availability, limits) by legal entity and jurisdiction? How do the asset utilization limits differ between "business as usual" and stressed conditions?</li> <li>• <b>Legal rights to collateral:</b> Does the bank have a process to establish what legal entities have contractual rights to that collateral? How does this impact the ability to access collateral during a resolution event?</li> <li>• <b>MIS Capabilities:</b> Does the bank have the MIS capabilities to quickly produce information required to reinstate funding from investors in resolution (e.g., amount, quality, type, jurisdiction of assets)?</li> </ul>	

# Appendix I: Operational Continuity Self-Assessment

## Instructions for Operational Continuity Self-Assessment Template

### Purpose

The purpose of the attached template is to assist the bank with the preparation of the resolution plan by ensuring the key aspects of the FSB *Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution* (Aug 18, 2016) are included within its resolution plan submissions.

### Demonstrate Resolvability

A resilient bank service delivery model supports the continuity of critical functions and separation of divestiture options as envisaged by the resolution strategy.

Through the resolution plan, the bank should demonstrate:

- A. All critical shared services are provided under contractual terms that can facilitate execution of the resolution strategy (e.g. continuity in resolution, assignability to support divestitures, cancellation to support wind-down);
- B. The bank is capable of generating timely information for third party contracts and intra-group service level agreements;
- C. The financial resources necessary to meet the contractual obligations for critical shared services are incorporated in the modelling of funding needs; and
- D. For the critical shared services that are at risk of termination in resolution, there are contingency options implementable within a timeframe that would avoid disruption to the continuity of functions.

The table below provides a brief description of the content as well as level of detail, the bank should include when completing the template.

Field	Description
Section	Refers to the section within the FSB <i>Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution</i> (August 2016), that the criteria are taken from.
Area	The heading or sub-heading, of the section within the FSB <i>Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution</i> (August 2016), that the criteria is taken from.
FSB Guidance Criteria	Briefly summarizes the target statement based on FSB guidance criteria.
Reference to relevant resolution plan section(s) or other sources (ex. recovery plans, bank policy/procedures, prior submission etc.)	This field should capture the section(s) of the resolution plan (or another source/document) that contains the specific information addressing the FSB guidance criteria.
if not in resolution plan, reference to relevant section(s) of the work plan	This field should identify the relevant section(s) of the work plan that outlines activities that will address the FSB guidance criteria.
Comments	This field is for any additional comments/information that the bank feels would support its self-assessment against the guidance criteria.

## Operational Continuity Self-Assessment Template

Section of the FSB Guidance	Area	FSB Guidance Criteria	Reference to Relevant Resolution Plan Section(s) or Other Source (Ex. Recovery Plans, Bank Policy/Procedures prior submission etc.)	If not in Resolution Plan, reference to Relevant Section(s) of the Work Plan.	Comments
1	Introduction	General Guidance			
2	The Concept of Operational Continuity	General Guidance			
3.1-3.4	Service Delivery Models and Resolvability	The resolution plan contains a sufficient level of details about the bank's selected service delivery model, or combination of delivery models. - This includes an updated mapping between critical functions, shared services and legal entities; and - An assessment of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the selected model or combination of models.			
3.5-3.7	<i>Provision of services within a regulated legal entity</i>	For the provision of services within a regulated legal entity, the resolution plan includes details about services provided to other entities in the group. This includes details about contractual documentation and the transparent, arm's length pricing mechanisms in place.  The resolution plan includes details about support arrangements for the retention or substitution of key staff from business lines that may be wound down or disposed of in resolution.			
3.8-3.11	<i>Provision of services by an intra-group service company</i>	For the provision of services by an intra-group service company, the plan considers the potential challenges for enforceability of SLAs or the continued performance of services that may arise during resolution. - The plan also describes the support arrangements that would ensure intra-group service companies have sufficient financial resources to cover its own operating costs throughout resolution.			
3.12-3.15	<i>Provision of services by a third-party service provider</i>	For the provision of services by a third-party service provider, the resolution plan addresses the contractual challenges that may arise during resolution with respect to the restrictions on the ability to transfer services, as well as the ability to modify the terms of the contract or existing contractual rights to terminate.			



Section of the FSB Guidance	Area	FSB Guidance Criteria	Reference to Relevant Resolution Plan Section(s) or Other Source (Ex. Recovery Plans, Bank Policy/Procedures prior submission etc.)	If not in Resolution Plan, reference to Relevant Section(s) of the Work Plan.	Comments
4.1-4.3	<b>Possible Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity</b>	The resolution plan includes sufficient details about the bank's arrangements to support operational continuity of the selected service model, during the two stages of resolution: (i) stabilization (ii) wind-down  In addition, the resolution plan includes considerations for how to manage the transition from 'business as usual' to operations during resolution.			
4.4 (i)	<b>Contractual Provisions</b>	The resolution plan describes contractual provisions and SLAs, for both intra-group and third party critical shared services, that are comprehensive, documented, and remain valid and enforceable in resolution.			
4.4 (ii)	<b>Management Information Systems</b>	The resolution plan clearly describes management information systems that are capable of producing timely reports on the provision and receipt of critical shared services on a legal entity and line of business basis.			
4.4 (iii)	<b>Financial Resources</b>	The resolution plan includes details about the sufficiency of financial resources that would be available to facilitate the operational continuity of critical functions in resolution.			
4.4 (iv)	<b>Robust Pricing Structures</b>	The resolution plan describes robust cost and pricing structures for services that are predictable, transparent and set on an arm's length basis with clear links between the original direct cost of the service and the allocated cost.			
4.4 (v)	<b>Operational Resilience and Resourcing</b>	The resolution plan describes critical shared services that are operationally resilient and have sufficient capacity (ex. Human resources and expertise) to support the restructuring phase.			
4.4 (vi)	<b>Governance</b>	The resolution plan describes critical shared services that have their own governance structure with clearly defined reporting lines.			
4.4 (vii)	<b>Rights of Use and Access</b>	The resolution plan clearly outlines the rights of use and access to operational assets related to critical shared services, that would not be disrupted by a failure or resolution of any particular group entity.			
4.5	<b>Operational Continuity Playbook</b>	The resolution plan considers the development and maintenance of an operational continuity 'playbook' to help facilitate operational continuity during resolution.			
4.6	<b>Contractual provisions</b>	General Guidance	Guidance	Guidance	Guidance

Section of the FSB Guidance	Area	FSB Guidance Criteria	Reference to Relevant Resolution Plan Section(s) or Other Source (Ex. Recovery Plans, Bank Policy/Procedures prior submission etc.)	If not in Resolution Plan, reference to Relevant Section(s) of the Work Plan.	Comments
4.6 (i)-(v)	<b>Documented Services (terms and clauses)</b>	The resolution plan describes services, from third party and intra-group entities that are well documented and include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clear service parameters against which service provision can be measured;</li> <li>- Terms and conditions that do not alter as a result of entering resolution;</li> <li>- Terms that allow for services to be transferred or assigned in resolution;</li> <li>- Clauses that allow for service continuation following divestment as a result of resolution; and</li> <li>- Resolution-resilient clauses that prevent contract modification or termination solely as a result of intervention/resolution.</li> </ul>			
4.7	<b>Services Continuation and Resolution Authority Powers</b>	General Guidance	Guidance	Guidance	Guidance
4.8-4.9	<b>Resolution strategies and post-stabilization restructuring</b>	The resolution plan describes how the selected service model (or combination of models) used by the bank supports business separability and restructuring.			
4.10 - 4.11	<b>Cross-border provision of shared services</b>	The resolution plan includes detailed consideration of the regulatory intervention risks associated with stakeholder behaviour, at the time of resolution, for entities outside of the jurisdiction of the home resolution authority.  The resolution plan identifies entities and services outside of the jurisdiction of the resolution authority, assesses their materiality, concludes on their impact to the resolution strategy, and proposes mitigating/remedial activities.			

Section of the FSB Guidance	Area	FSB Guidance Criteria	Reference to Relevant Resolution Plan Section(s) or Other Source (Ex. Recovery Plans, Bank Policy/Procedures prior submission etc.)	If not in Resolution Plan, reference to Relevant Section(s) of the Work Plan.	Comments
Annex	Indicative information requirements to facilitate operational continuity	Overall, the resolution plan contains details about access (timely and accurate) to management information systems during resolution, as well as a detailed mapping of Critical Functions and Critical Shared Service providers and recipients.			
A1	Information requirements: Staff required for the provision of critical shared services	Overall, the resolution plan contains details about the identification and retention of key staff required for the provision of critical shared services.			
A2	Information requirements: Operational, legal and governance structure of critical shared services	Overall, the resolution plan contains sufficient details about the operational, legal and governance structure of critical shared services			
A3	Information requirements: Contractual arrangements	Overall, the resolution plan contains sufficient details about contractual arrangements governing service provision, including consideration of the risks to service disruption during resolution.			

## Appendix J: Trading Book Wind-Down Template

### Schedule 1: Trading book profile - Segmentation

The bank is expected to use judgement, supported by a clear rationale, when populating the template, ensuring that the resulting segmentation provides a good basis for differentiating between parts of the trading book that would be subject to different wind-down strategies in resolution. All position characteristics that significantly affect the wind-down approach should be reflected in the segmentation. Each field will however not be relevant for all parts of the trading book (e.g. "OTC" only applies to derivatives). In these cases, the bank may indicate that a differentiation along the dimension is not relevant or not applicable for the product type in question. Business area, product type, governing jurisdiction and booking entity should however always be seen as relevant.

The table below provides further guidance on the type of information to be provided in the respective fields.

Field	Description
Unique segment ID	Each segment line should have a unique identifier. The bank may choose a simple integer approach (1, 2, 3, 4...), or use decimals (1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2...) or alphanumeric (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2...) to provide a hierarchical structure. These identifiers can be used when referring to a specific segment in text.
Business area	The bank may align with its internal business hierarchy or classification of its trading book. For example, the business area could be an asset class, e.g. "Fixed Income", "Commodities", "Foreign Exchange"/"Currency", "Equity", etc. From the information in this field, it should also be clear which trading positions are not part of the bank's trading or capital markets business, e.g. "Treasury" for positions held by Treasury.
Sub-business area	The bank may use this field, for example, to represent a desk, product set or region, e.g. "Interest Rate Derivatives".
Product type	The bank should classify products in a way that provides sufficient differentiation between products that would be subject to different wind-down strategies. The name of the product type should be self-explanatory, e.g. "Interest rate swaps". The bank can also differentiate between linear and non-linear products/financial instruments.
OTC	For derivatives, the bank should indicate whether they are over-the-counter, exchange-listed and/or cleared through a central counterparty (CCP).
Governing jurisdiction	Governing jurisdiction is defined as the jurisdiction specified in a contract that will govern any dispute that arises between the parties to the contract.
Booking entity	The legal entity in which the trading position is booked. Only entities identified as material legal entities need to be specified, all other entities can be captured as "Other entities".

<b>Field</b>	<b>Description</b>
Structural balance sheet hedge	The bank should indicate whether positions are used as structural balance sheet hedges (“Structural balance sheet hedge”) or not (“-”).
[Placeholder for additional segmentation dimension]	The bank may use these fields to add additional segmentation dimensions where they find it relevant.
Fair value hierarchy level / Liquidity	The bank should indicate whether positions are Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 according to the fair value hierarchy. In the event that this information is not easily available, banks may classify positions into buckets leveraging any other information that the bank’s management uses to identify asset liquidity and price discovery. For example, there could be three buckets: 1) very liquid, where there are many market makers (e.g. exchange-listed very liquid stock), 2) relatively liquid, where there are some/few market makers (e.g. plain vanilla OTC derivatives), and 3) illiquid, where there are very few or one market maker of the financial instrument (e.g. exotic OTC derivatives).
Fair value of segment in millions of CAD	The fair value in millions of Canadian dollars for the segment.
Notional amount in millions of CAD	Total notional in millions of Canadian dollars for the segment.
Description of segment and activities performed	The bank should provide a concise description of the activities associated with the segment. In particular, where the assets in the segment are identified as assets that cannot be sold, exited or moved, a brief description of the characteristics that prevent such actions should be provided in this field.

## Schedule 2: Assignment of wind-down strategy

The template should summarize the list of assigned wind-down strategies and time to wind-down for each segment.

The table below provides guidance on the information to be provided in these fields.

Field	Description
Wind-down strategy	The expected exit strategy, e.g. from the list of example exit strategies in Appendix K or any other strategy as identified by the bank.
Single exit action / multiple exit actions	The bank should indicate whether a single exit action is expected or whether the segment is expected to be wound down through multiple exit actions spread over the wind-down period.
Time to wind-down	The bank should indicate the approximate time, expressed in months, required to wind-down the segment.

## Schedule 3: Impact on liquidity and capital

In this template, the bank should outline the net liquidity impact and the expected losses<sup>57</sup> for each trading book segment for the selected points in time

The table below provides guidance on the information to be provided in these fields.

Field	Description
Net cash flow in millions of CAD (compared to T0)	For each wind-down segment, these fields should indicate the cumulative sum of liquidity inflows net of liquidity outflows from T <sub>0</sub> to T+2 days, T+3 months, T+6 months, T+12 months as well as to the end of the wind-down. If inflows are higher than outflows the net liquidity position should be shown as positive. If outflows are larger than inflows it should be shown as negative.
Net impact on available non-cash collateral in millions of CAD (compared to T0)	For the aggregate trading book (i.e. across all segments) these fields should indicate the cumulative sum of previously posted non-cash collateral becoming available through the wind-down net of any additional collateral requirements from T <sub>0</sub> to T+2 days, T+3 months, T+6 months, T+12 months as well as to the end of the wind-down. If collateral becoming available (freed up) is higher than incremental collateral requirements the net impact on

<sup>57</sup> Losses refer to losses incurred due to actions associated with the resolution (e.g. counterparty actions) and actions taken by the bank as part of their strategy for the trading book (e.g. liquidation of positions); not the expected losses due to market movements or counterparty defaults that are not the result of the trading-book wind-down.

Field	Description
	<p>available non-cash collateral should be shown as positive. If incremental non-cash collateral requirements are larger than collateral becoming available, it should be shown as negative.</p> <p>Note that only non-cash collateral should be shown, as the impact on cash collateral should be captured through the net cash flow.</p>
Assumed average haircut (%)	This field should, if applicable, indicate the average haircut the bank assumes it would need to accept for the wind-down of the segment, given the proposed wind-down strategy and timeframe.
Aggregate cumulative realized losses in millions of CAD (from T0)	<p>For each wind-down segment, these fields should indicate the total cumulative realized losses from the wind-down, net of gains, experienced from T<sub>0</sub> to T+2 days, T+3 months, T+6 months, T+12 months as well as to the end of the wind-down. Losses should be shown as negative, or if gains are expected to be larger than losses, this should be shown as positive.</p> <p>These estimates should capture only losses resulting from the resolution (e.g. actions by counterparties or authorities) and actions taken by the bank as part of its strategy for the trading book (e.g. exit costs from liquidation of positions); and not the expected losses due to market movements or counterparty defaults that are not the result of the trading-book wind-down.</p>

## Appendix K: Examples of Wind-Down Strategies

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Below is a list of examples of potential wind-down strategies. The list is not intended to be exhaustive and the bank can define additional exit strategies not included in this list.

- Hold to maturity (matures within wind-down time frame)
- Hold to maturity (unable to wind-down within wind-down time frame)
- Cash security sale or buyback
- Package and sell
- Exercise contractual option to terminate (termination by bank if contractually feasible)
- Contract assumed to be terminated by counterparty
- Trade tear up (cancel for up-front payment)
- Exchange traded derivative closeout
- Negotiated close out
- Novation
- Return of collateral



## Appendix L: Work Plan Template

Action item	Relevant resolution plan section(s)	Related work plan actions / supporting workstreams	Timing		Ownership		Progress update			Planned activities over the next 12 months	Internal testing plan
			Start	End	Lead	Oversight	Stage	Status	Comments		
1...											
2...											
3...											
4...											

## Appendix M: Suggested Table of Contents

Below is a high-level overview of how CDIC expects the D-SIB's resolution plan to be structured.

### Table of Contents

<b>1.</b>	<b>Section 1 – Resolution profile &amp; strategy</b>	.....
	Resolution profile	.....
	Resolution strategy	.....
<b>2.</b>	<b>Section 2 – Financial feasibility analysis</b>	.....
	Assumptions for the resolution scenario	.....
	Resolution scenario analysis	.....
<b>3.</b>	<b>Section 3 – Operational plan</b>	.....
	Capabilities to support crisis preparedness	.....
	Bail-in execution	.....
	Valuation in resolution	.....
	Capabilities to support recapitalization & funding actions	.....
	Operational continuity of critical shared services	.....
	Continuity of access to FMIs	.....
	Trading book wind-down plan	.....
	Key regulators & actions to satisfy regulatory requirements	.....
<b>4.</b>	<b>Section 4 – Resolution plan testing</b>	.....
	Testing program policies and procedures	.....
	Overview of testing program for the upcoming year	.....
<b>5.</b>	<b>Section 5 – Impediments and work plan</b>	.....
	Bank's work plan	.....
<b>6.</b>	<b>Appendices<sup>58</sup></b>	.....

<sup>58</sup> The Bank should use consistent nomenclature to ensure ease of reference between sections of the resolution plan and their corresponding appendices, where applicable.

